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Old and New Peace Agreements
Gregory H. Fox*
What should international law make of peace agreements? In the
nineteenth century, when treaties regularly ended interstate armed
conflicts (“IACs”), the answer was easy. Peace agreements were binding
treaties whose terms could be freely dictated by the winning side. Peace
agreements also signaled that a series of rules specific to wartime were no
longer operable. Contemporary peace agreements share neither of these
characteristics because they largely end non-international armed
conflicts (“NIACs”). Agreements between governments and rebels do not
meet the definition of a binding treaty. And IAC agreements’ signaling
function has long passed into obsolescence. How then, if at all, do new
NIAC peace agreements engage with international law?
This Article argues that international law has become critical to their
genesis in two respects. First, the agreements parallel international law’s
concern with governance issues by restructuring domestic institutions.
Their governance focus is the logical consequence of international law’s
refusal to “resolve” NIACs through large-scale and violent changes to
national borders or demographic profiles. Former combatants must live
with each other, and NIAC agreements seek to structure their peaceful coexistence.
Second, all stages of NIAC agreements have become heavily
multilateralized. International actors wield incentives and sanctions from
the onset of conflict through the agreements’ implementation. In so doing,
they radically expand the factors militating toward a peace settlement.
These added factors, especially those providing a “credible commitment”
of enforcing the agreement, reconfigure the parties’ incentives as to
whether or not a negotiated end to conflict will serve their interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What should international law make of peace agreements? In the
nineteenth century, when peace agreements were the “the normal mode
of terminating war,” the answer was easy.1 As written agreements
between sovereign states, they were the very definition of a binding
treaty.2 Such was their importance to interstate relations—they often
ended wars between major European powers by shifting borders,
prescribing dynastic successions, exacting reparations and even
extinguishing entire states—that they retained their legal validity even
when imposed on defeated states under conditions of extreme duress.3
Beyond this strictly contractual role, peace agreements also informed
the international community that a state of war ended and peaceful
relations resumed. This “signaling” function terminated a series of
specialized rules operating only in wartime.4 More broadly, many peace
agreements of this era played a forward-looking, constitutive role. As
Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor observe, “since wars were often
fought over differing views of the international order and the
relationships between states, peace treaties provided, at least in theory,
a structural framework for international order.”5

1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (1905); see also CHARLES G. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 574 (1924) (Of the three ways in which war can be terminated, a
treaty of peace “has been the one most frequently resorted to; and it has become the
established practice of recent times where both belligerents survive the conflict.”).
2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 517 (“International treaties are conventions or
contracts between two or more States concerning various matters of interest.”). The
law of treaties was consistent for centuries in limiting treaty parties to sovereign states.
See SIR ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 35 (1961).
3 See discussion infra Section II.2.
4 See discussion infra Part III.
5 CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MARY KALDOR, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW WARS 379 (2017).
Examples abound. Law students are taught to date the emergence of the modern
international legal order to the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia. Leo Gross, The Peace of
Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 20 (1948). The Congress of Vienna
articulated a (now discredited) theory of governmental legitimacy. Sean D. Murphy,
Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments, 48 INT’L & COMPAR.
L.Q. 545, 567 (1999). Many national borders originated in peace agreements, including
those of new states. MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 230 (1986); JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 530–31 (2d ed. 2007); Andrew P.
Owsiak, Allison K. Cuttner & Brent Buck, The International Border Agreements Dataset,
35 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 559, 563 (2016). The era of international organizations
began with the Treaty of Versailles, as did the first tentative steps toward decolonization
via the mandate system. Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System Under the
League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 47, 54–55 (2005).
And peace agreements have created dispute resolution bodies whose jurisprudence has
elaborated on a range of international legal principles. The 1794 Jay Treaty between the
United States and Great Britain, for example, created three separate adjudicatory
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But virtually no contemporary peace agreements share these
characteristics. The primary reason appears to be the conflicts they
resolve. The older agreements ended international armed conflicts
(“IACs”), not infrequently among the most powerful states in Europe.
The overwhelming majority of recent wars have been non-international
armed conflicts (“NIACs”) in developing states, pitting governments
against rebel groups.6 The presence of non-state parties to agreements
ending these conflicts means the instruments do not meet the widely
accepted definition of a binding “treaty.”7 The signaling function of
older IAC agreements applied only to interstate agreements, and in any
case, has long been superseded by developments in the law of armed
conflict and other areas of international law previously triggered by the
war/peace transition. As for peace agreements launching systemic
innovation, NIAC agreements have largely focused inward, seeking to
pacify and reform societies riven by civil war. Many fewer opportunities
to reorder interstate relations exist through ending internal conflicts in
developing countries, in which one party is not a state at all, and whose
resolution only rarely implicates the core interests of major powers.
If NIAC agreements have not stepped into the legal footprint of
traditional IAC agreements, how are we to understand their place in
international law? Beyond the pioneering work of Christine Bell and a
few other authors, one struggles to find in recent scholarship any
description of the broader legal significance of NIAC peace agreements.8
Many contemporary international law treatises and overviews of treaty
law do not even mention peace agreements, apparently finding
insufficient state practice or doctrine to merit discussion. Major powers
commissions. See Richard B. Lillich, The Jay Treaty Commissions, 37 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 260,
261 (1963).
6 Of the fifty-four conflicts active in 2019, only two were interstate and almost all
took place in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Therése Pettersson & Magnus Öberg,
Organized Violence, 1989–2019, 56 J. PEACE RSCH. 597, 597–99 (2020).
7 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The legal status of agreements with non-state rebel groups is the
subject of furious debate. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 130–139.
8 Most significantly, CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE (2008); CHRISTINE BELL,
PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their
Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373 (2006) [hereinafter Bell, Peace
Agreements Nature and Legal Status]; CINDY WITTKE, LAW IN THE TWILIGHT: INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF PEACE
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE PARTIES (2018); PHILIPP KASTNER, LEGAL
NORMATIVITY IN THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (2015).
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appear to view peace agreements of any kind as largely irrelevant to
their military planning. The United States Department of Defense Law
of War Manual, newly updated in 2016, devotes less than half a page
(out of 1236) to peace agreements, mentioning only IAC agreements as
examples.9 The same is true of the 2013 German Manual.10 No
discussion of peace agreements appears at all in the Australian,
Canadian, UK, or French manuals.11
The question of how to situate NIAC agreements in international
law is also complicated by gaps in data about the agreements
themselves. If we don’t know the common characteristics of NIAC
agreements, how can we generalize about their relation to international
law and institutions? First, the most comprehensive peace agreement
dataset, created by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (“UCDP”) and
covering both IACs and NIACs, begins only in 1975.12 As will be seen,
this is long after NIACs began to eclipse IACs as the most common form
of armed conflict and so potentially undercounts IAC agreements. By
excluding the era of IAC prevalence, it also precludes comparison to the
frequency and content of IAC agreements. Second, while both UCDP and
the University of Edinburgh’s Peace Agreement Database (“PA-X”) code
NIAC agreements for a wide range of substantive provisions, those
provisions are not necessarily grounded in international law. Third,
NIAC peace processes often involve multiple agreements over time,
some of which are incorporated into a final agreement and some of
which are not.13 Unless one asks whether final agreements incorporate
prior agreements and, if they do, code those prior agreements as well,
one cannot get an accurate picture of all the obligations adopted by the
parties at the end of a peace process. Both UCDP and PA-X code
preliminary and final agreements separately, failing to produce such an
aggregate assessment.
This Article will argue that even absent this important information,
one can discern four ways the new NIAC agreements engage with
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL §3.8.1 (2016).
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL 37 (2013).
11 The full texts of these manuals are available at https://usnwc.libguides.com/
c.php?g=86619&p=557511. Neither the Chinese nor the Russian military manual is
publicly available.
12 Therése Pettersson & Magnus Öberg, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, Peace
Agreement Dataset (2020), https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#peaceagreement.
13 The November 21, 1995 Dayton Accord ending the Bosnian civil war, for example,
incorporated by reference the prior Agreed Basic Principles (09/08/1995), the Further
Agreed Basic Principles (09/26/1995) and Ceasefire Agreements for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (09/14/1995 and 10/05/1995). See General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. A/50/790 (Nov. 30, 1995) (Attachment).
9
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international law that are wholly distinct from their IAC predecessors.
Importantly, all but one of these modes of engagement is indirect rather
than direct. My characterization of international law as “engaging” with
NIAC agreements rather than “controlling,” “regulating,” “constraining,”
or “governing” is thus deliberate. Peace agreements, I will argue, have
transitioned from being direct subjects of international law in the
nineteenth century to being the indirect objects of norms and
institutions in the era of NIAC predominance. This contrast in modes of
engagement between the two sets of instruments will make clear that
no unified legal category of “peace agreement” in fact exists.
The first mode is the lone point of direct engagement: the question
of whether NIAC agreements are legally binding under contemporary
treaty law. As noted, because the agreements necessarily involve at
least one non-state party—usually a rebel group—they are not
“treaties” under the standard definition in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Are NIAC agreements then simply soft law instruments,
despite their legal form and the frequently expressed view of the U.N.
Security Council that such agreements are binding? Christine Bell ably
set out the terms of this debate, though new data on Security Council
actions supplements her early conclusions.14 This Article will not
address this question at length, in large part because the binding or nonbinding nature of NIAC agreements has little practical consequence
outside their infrequent appearance before national courts.
The second mode of engagement is the agreements’ role as an
under-analyzed means of domesticating international law. Many NIAC
agreements call for significant reform of national laws and governing
institutions. The normative foundations for those reforms are
addressed by a host of treaty obligations on human rights, democratic
elections, official corruption, women’s rights, territorial integrity,
protection of the environment, and other topics. Normally, the
implementation of such treaty-based norms involves an oftencumbersome process of legislative and administrative incorporation
into national law, as well as potential review. NIAC agreements would
appear to circumvent these steps. Both the incumbent government and
its rebel challengers—in other words, all de facto and de jure authorities
in the state—consent to the agreements’ implementation. This Article
will defer the empirical questions of whether, and to what extent, post14 Bell, Peace Agreements Nature and Legal Status, supra note 8; Gregory H. Fox,
Kristen E. Boon & Isaac Jenkins, The Contributions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions to the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence of Customary
International Law, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 674–79 (2018) (describing data showing
Security Council regularly treats NIAC agreements as binding).
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Cold War NIAC agreements reflect a range of substantive international
law doctrines to a future research project.15
Third, NIAC agreements regularly focus on governance issues in
post-conflict states, mirroring a host of norms ascendant in the NIAC
era. Former antagonists cannot, as in IACs, retreat to their respective
national territories to secure the peace, but must continue to live
together under the same laws and political institutions. NIAC
agreements frequently seek to make these inclusive and transparent in
an effort to enhance their legitimacy. These governance provisions
parallel international norms on human rights, free and fair elections,
judicial independence, minority rights, gender equality and anticorruption, among others. This Article will describe this parallelism in
general terms, leaving the precise extent of NIAC agreements
incorporating international law to the future empirical project.
Finally, NIAC agreements interact with the international legal
system through the highly multilateralized setting in which most are
conceived, negotiated, and implemented. This is perhaps the most
radical departure from the old IAC model and will be the final focus of
this Article. International law of the nineteenth century placed no
external limits on peace agreements, allowing victorious parties to foist
coerced agreements on vanquished states, by which they might remove
their citizens en masse, annex their territory, exact reparations, and
much more. This is not to say third states and, eventually, international
organizations (“IOs”), did not undertake diplomatic initiatives to end
IACs. But without any legal restraints on the use of armed force, the
objectives for which force might be used or the terms of any eventual
peace, IAC agreements functioned almost as private contracts between
the warring states.
While NIAC agreements retain a private contractual form, that
characterization does little justice to the extent of international
institutions’ influence on their genesis, negotiation, and
implementation. Most are marinated in the policy preferences of those
institutions. The conflicts they resolve have often been subject to years
of binding U.N. Security Council resolutions.16 The U.N. and other

That project, now in progress by the author, will draw on a new dataset of all final
post-1990 NIAC agreements. It will address the three empirical questions underlying
this accelerated means of domestication: (1) whether, and to what extent, post-Cold War
NIAC agreements reflect a range of substantive international law doctrines; (2) whether
the agreement obligations are in fact incorporated into the states’ national law; and (3)
what factors account for higher and lower rates of incorporation.
16 To take the case of South Sudan, the Security Council passed ten resolutions on
various aspects of the conflict from the country’s independence in 2011 to the 2015
15
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international organizations frequently convene and moderate the peace
negotiations, and IO representatives often sign the documents as
observers or even parties. Implementation of the agreements is often
overseen by outsiders, such as U.N. peacekeepers.17 Violations of the
agreements, or even refusals to negotiate in good faith, can lead to
condemnation and sanctions imposed by individual states, the Security
Council, and other IOs. Finally, the presence of international
organizations as facilitators and guarantors has significantly altered the
incentive structure for NIAC parties contemplating a negotiated peace.
In sum, I will argue that international law both abandoned peace
agreements in their traditional IAC iteration and embraced them as
critical vehicles for responding to contemporary NIACs. This Article will
explore this historical transition, for which some scholars have
proposed entirely new legal categories to account for NIAC instruments:
Christine Bell’s “lex pacificatoria” and Carsten Stahn’s exploration of a
“jus post bellum” are two thoughtful and prominent examples.18 But I
will argue that a doctrinal niche, new or old, is unnecessary to
understanding the contemporary landscape. NIAC agreements occupy
one point on a spectrum of deep international engagement in the
underlying internal conflicts. At each point, I will argue, international
institutions have both sought to move conflict states away from paths
deeply disfavored by international law and toward new social
structures favored by norms concerned with governance. The
agreements aggregate those preferences in efforts to foster national
stability and reconciliation. NIAC agreements are thus vehicles to give
effect to normative preferences found elsewhere in international law, as
well as engage international actors in the task. No new doctrinal niche
is needed to understand this facilitating role.

Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. See S.C. Res. 2252 (Dec. 15,
2015) (listing prior Council resolutions).
17 Many peacekeeping missions are given mandates specifically tied to peace
agreements. The BINUCA mission to the Central African Republic, for example, was
authorized by the Security Council in 2013 “to work with all parties to facilitate the full
implementation of agreements signed in Libreville on 11 January 2013.” S.C. Res. 2088,
¶ 6 (Jan. 24, 2014). In the Côte D’Ivoire, the Security Council requested the UNOCI
mission “to support the full implementation of the Ouagadougou political Agreement.”
S.C. Res. 1765, ¶ 2 (July 16, 2007).
18 See generally BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE, supra note 8; JUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE
NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014);
JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE (Carsten Stahn &
Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008); Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 311 (2008); Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad bellum’, ‘jus in bello’ . . . ‘jus post
bellum’? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921
(2006).
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The discussion will proceed as follows. Part II describes the
external focus of IAC peace agreements under traditional international
laws of the nineteenth century. Subsections describe the extreme
autonomy afforded peace treaty parties, including the ability to use
military force to extract favorable treaty terms, the lack of a coercion
defense to such imposed agreements, the lack of limits on substantive
provisions, the absence of multilateral parties or facilitators, and a lack
of interest in addressing conflicts’ root causes. It then describes IAC
agreements’ “signaling” function, a formal notice to the international
community that the state of war ended. Part III describes the demise of
IAC agreements’ frequency and legal salience. Part IV describes the
uncertainty surrounding the legal status of newly ascendant NIAC
agreements. Part V discusses the first way those agreements interact
with contemporary international law—via their focus on governance.
That focus parallels a host of contemporary norms. Part VI describes
the second mode of interaction: the abandonment of the largely bilateral
character of IAC agreements with a highly mutlilateralized process.
II. TRADITIONAL IAC PEACE AGREEMENTS IN SERVICE OF STATES INTERESTS
We begin with IAC agreements. For purposes of contrasting
traditional IAC agreements with contemporary NIAC agreements, I will
focus on international law of the nineteenth century. This is the most
recent era in which states regularly entered into IAC peace agreements
and the last time those agreements enjoyed a widely accepted legal
status. When IAC agreements began their precipitous decline after
World War I, this well-established role experienced multiple challenges.
International law treatises of the time did not provide a concise
definition of peace treaties, though they did distinguish final agreements
(our concern) from preliminary instruments such as armistices,
“preliminaries of peace,” and procedures to be followed at peace
conferences (if they were held).19 Peace agreements were one of several
alternative means of terminating war.20 The lack of a definition may
simply be due to the termination itself having more legal significance—
as our discussion of treaties’ “signaling function” will show—than the
means by which termination occurred. It might also be due to peace
Preliminaries of peace dealt with substantive issues deemed critical to resolve
before full negotiations began. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF
PEACE 96–97 (1916). An armistice agreement “suspends military operations by mutual
agreement between the belligerent parties.” Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, art. 36, July 29, 1899.
20 The others were the simple cessation of hostilities or the conquest of one state by
the other. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 579 (1895).
19
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agreements being understood as not inherently different in their formal
requirements from any other treaty of the period, making a separate
definition unnecessary.21
For purposes of comparing IAC and NIAC agreements, the most
important formal characteristic of nineteenth century peace treaties is
that they were made between states. 22 This is not only a descriptively
obvious point, as only states fought in IACs and so were the only parties
to treaties by which they ended. It also reflects the state-centrism of
nineteenth century international law that limited treaties of any kind to
states.23 If a NIAC was terminated by written agreement, one party
would necessarily be a rebel group opposing the government, meaning
the agreement could not qualify as a binding treaty. NIAC agreements
simply had no legal status in the nineteenth century, a state of affairs
many argue persists to this day.24
With states at the center of peace processes, what constraints did
nineteenth century international law place on their power to extract
terms? The answer turns out to be virtually none. IAC agreements of
this period were often described as private contracts, with the terms
reflecting only the interests of the treaty parties. Coleman Philippson
declared that “[e]very treaty of peace proper must have a bilateral
character; it must involve reciprocal concessions, however unequal they
may be.”25 Peace treaties accomplished their purpose “by means of a
bargain settling each side’s claims and pretensions.”26 Henry Wheaton
called them agreements “to waive all discussion concerning the
respective rights and claims of the parties, and to bury in oblivion the

21 PHILLIPSON, supra note 19, at 164; OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 282; THEODORE
DWIGHT WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (1886); see also
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 37 (6th ed. 2017) (“Despite their
unique political standing, treaties of peace are no different juridically from other types
of inter-State agreements, and they are governed by the general law of treaties.”).
22 For this reason, most of the definitions used by political scientists in quantitative
analyses of peace agreements are unhelpful, since they also encompass agreements
between states and non-state actors. For example, Tanisha Fazal defines peace
agreements as “the written documents that describe contracts between belligerents to
cease hostilities and resolve issues under dispute . . . .” Tanisha M. Fazal, The Demise of
Peace Treaties in Interstate War, 67 INT’L ORG. 695, 696 (2013). See also BELL, ON THE LAW
OF PEACE, supra note 8, at 47–48 (describing various additional non-legal definitions).
23 WOOLSEY, supra note 21 at 166 (“Treaties can be made only by the constituted
authorities of nations, or by persons specially deputed by them for that purpose.”).
24 Jann K. Kleffner, Peace Treaties, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 21 (2011) (describing “the international legal status or lack
thereof of peace agreements” ending civil wars as “uncertain.”).
25 PHILLIPSON, supra note 19, at 165.
26 Id.
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original causes of the war.”27 The parties were free to contract out of
default rules concerning the post-war disposition of territory, property,
citizens, and war materiel.28
But even the contract analogy was inadequate to describe the
absolute autonomy states enjoyed in crafting IAC peace treaties. Private
contracts under national law are limited by principles of public policy
from which parties cannot consensually derogate. Few, if any, such
limits constrained IAC agreement parties. The power dynamics
between the negotiating states, especially the harm they could lawfully
inflict on each other absent an agreement, were virtually the sole
determinants of whether and how an IAC agreement would conclude.29
In contrast to the substantial influence of international public policy
considerations on contemporary NIAC agreements, nineteenth century
international law expressed no such collective preferences.30
International law’s agnosticism on the terms of IAC agreements,
and the circumstances of their conclusion, took several specific forms.
A. Unrestricted Use of Force
First, warring states could not seek advantage in treaty
negotiations by arguing that they were the victims of an unlawful use of
force or force used for an unlawful objective. Resort to force in the
nineteenth century was famously a legitimate tool of statecraft.31
Oppenheim declared in the first edition of his influential treatise that
“war is not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by, International
Law.”32 He mocked those who argued for legal limitations as “fanatics
of international peace” who could not “grasp the idea of a law between
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 706 (3d ed. 1889).
HALL, supra note 20, at 616.
29 According to commentary to the 1935 Harvard Research on International Law,
the “usual procedure” in peace treaty negotiations was for “the victorious belligerent to
state the terms on which it is willing to conclude peace with the enemy or to present the
latter’s plenipotentiaries at the peace conference with the draft of a treaty embodying
the terms which it insists upon. The plenipotentiaries of the defeated State are told that
the acceptance of the terms is a condition of the cessation of the war. They are given to
understand also that if the terms are not accepted hostilities will be renewed or
continued, if an armistice has been proclaimed.” Harvard Research in International Law,
29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 1148, 1154 (1935).
30 PHILLIPSON, supra note 19, at 165 (“It is not an impartial judge who effects this
accommodation; it is the disputants themselves who do so, and in general they are
unequally matched, so that less than justice may be done.”).
31 SIR SHERSTON BAKER BART, 1 HALLECK’S INT’L L. 472 (rev. ed. 1878) (“Where the war
is duly declared or begun, and carried on by the proper authority of the State, it is a
lawful war, and, by the voluntary law of nations, is regarded as a just war so far as the
belligerent rights of the parties are concerned.”).
32 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 56.
27
28
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Sovereign States.”33 States might legitimately seek any objective in war,
including the subjugation of a defeated power, which involved
“extermination in war of one belligerent by another through annexation
of the former’s territory after conquest, the enemy forces having been
annihilated.”34 Because subjugation and peace treaties were equally
available means of ending a conflict, a warring state losing badly on the
battlefield knew that its very existence might depend on it not making
excessive demands at the bargaining table.
B. Validity of Coerced Peace Agreements
Second, not only were states denied whatever rhetorical or
reputational value might be gained by invoking legal limits on
aggressive force, they also could not claim that peace agreements were
invalid because they had been coerced by threats of force. The PCIJ, in a
wonderful example of formalistic reasoning, described Germany’s
“agreement[]” to the Versailles Treaty as nothing more than it exercising
an “attribute of state sovereignty,” presumably no different from any
state consenting to any other treaty obligation.35 Similarly, Vattel
argued that a defeated state faced with imposed terms of peace “freely
chooses a loss that is present and certain, but limited in extent, in
preference to a disaster, not yet arrived, but very probable, and terrible
in character.”36 Peace agreements were an exception to the general rule
voiding coerced treaties void ab initio.37 Of course, every peace
agreement is coerced in one way or another.38 International law of the
OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 55–56.
Id. at 278; see also id. at 278–79 (If a state “desires to acquire the whole of the
conquered territory for himself, he annexes it, and thereby formally ends the war
through subjugation.”).
35 S.S. Wimbledon, Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (Germany
accepting Article 380 of the Versailles Treaty, requiring that the Kiel Canal “be
maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace
with Germany on terms of entire equality,” was not an infringement of its
sovereignty but “an attribute of State sovereignty”); id. at 21.
36 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 356 (Charles G. Fenwick, trans. 1916)
(1758), quoted in STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 117 (2005).
37 Harvard Research, supra note 29, at 1154 (If a soon-to-be defeated state is
informed that acceptance of a peace agreement “is a condition of the cessation of the
war,” its representatives “are free to choose between acceptance of the treaty or the
renewal or continuance of the war with whatever consequences that may entail. There
is no duress in the legal sense of the term as it is used here, since the negotiator is free
to refuse to sign the treaty and accept instead the other alternative.”); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 738 (1945) (“The defeated State has given its
consent under constraint but, nevertheless, it has given its consent, and out of this
consent the agreement is born.” (quoting Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission)).
38 PHILLIPSON, supra note 19, at 162 (“Nearly every treaty of peace confers
advantages on one side, and imposes disadvantages on the other. That is the
33
34
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period might have distinguished between treaties resulting from lawful
and unlawful uses of force, as is the case under the contemporary law of
treaties.39 But because no such distinction then existed, the legitimacy
of coerced peace treaties necessarily followed: if aggressive wars were
lawful then a treaty embodying the fruits of an aggressive war must also
be lawful.40 This was so evidently true to international lawyers of the
pre-Charter era that, as Lord McNair recounted, in the many cases
litigated before international tribunals involving the undoubtedly
coerced treaties ending the First World War, he was not aware “that the
plea of coercion has ever been advanced as an argument for the voidness
or voidability of a treaty.”41
C. No Limits on Substantive Provisions of Peace Treaties
Third, international law did not prescribe the specific terms of a
peace agreement, either by means of inclusion or exclusion. As George
Schwarzenberger explained in 1945:
In unorganised international society there are no limits to the
contents of a peace treaty or any other treaty. On this level,
parties to peace treaties or analogous instruments are free to
employ, as they wish, the rules of international law on Consent
to work out the legal implications of their victories, defeats or
stalemates. It is entirely for them to decide on whether they
wish to go back to any particular status quo ante bellum or
establish a new status quo post bellum.42
Defeated states might give up the most dearly held sovereign
prerogatives, and international law would not countermand that
“choice.”43 This freedom of contract included the ability to modify
otherwise applicable rules of international law concerning the end of
armed conflict.44 Defeated states could not claim rights under these
rules if a peace agreement they were compelled to sign provided
otherwise.

fundamental nature of the transaction. If peace negotiation is not an actual extension,
in another plane of conflict, of the military operations of the belligerents, it is at all events
a substitute therefor, and cannot possibly be considered as being immune from all
threats and pressure.”).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 90–92.
40 DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 39.
41 LORD ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 209 (1961).
42 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 37, at 731 (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 741.
44 Id. at 743 (“This practice confirms that peace treaties, like other treaties, may
override international customary law; for the whole of this law is jus dispositivum.”).
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D. Peace Agreements Only Involved States
Fourth, as noted briefly above, peace agreements were negotiated
by states, for states, to be implemented by states. They were not the
product of collective policy preferences, as might be manifest in
multilateral treaties or the decisions of international organizations.
Most agreements were negotiated bilaterally. When third parties
facilitated or joined the negotiations, they were usually other states or
groups of states with interests in the particular conflict or regional
stability.45 In his treatise on the termination of war, Coleman Phillipson
describes innumerable cases of “good offices and mediation” between
1648 and 1913. All involved states.46
The point here is not that states in the nineteenth century did not
work together to avoid or end conflict or that they lacked a common
interest in maintaining the peace. Some have argued that the Concert of
Europe system—established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and
responsible for a series of peace conferences throughout the century
and for mediating and intervening in conflicts—functioned as an
“international security institution.”47 It is certainly true, particularly in
the aftermath of the French Revolution, that the dominant states of
Europe found common cause in stanching the spread of popular
uprisings and then, over time, maintaining stability in Europe and on its
periphery.48 And the Concert system did utilize a set of inchoate norms,
rules, and procedures to regularize its responses.49 The point is rather
that these efforts did not even attempt to transcend the specific national
interests of the leading European states. 50 One might also add that the
lack of a sovereign equality principle posed a significant barrier to the
Concert taking account of smaller states’ interests.51
45 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 322 (discussing good offices and mediation exclusively
on the part of neutral states).
46 PHILLIPSON, supra note 19, at 75–93.
47 Louise Richardson, The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the
Nineteenth Century, in IMPERFECT UNIONS: SECURITY INSTITUTIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 48, 49
(Helga Haftendorn et al., eds. 1999); see also QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 934 (2d ed.
1965).
48 See generally RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE
CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1958).
49 Richardson, supra note 47, at 51.
50 Thomas Fitschen, Vienna Congress (1815), in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anne Peters ed., 2015) (Concert system “was little more than
a temporary equation of military might and political influence between the greater
powers on the European continent.”).
51 As Mangone observes, “without a continuous organization the Great Powers
convened sporadically and acted only by unanimous consent. The opinion of the small
disinterested states during the nineteenth century was not regarded as relevant to the
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E. No Preference for Addressing Root Causes of Conflict
Finally, while the primary (though, as we shall see below, by no
means only) purpose of an IAC agreement was to resolve the specific
issues that led to war, international law left the means of addressing
root causes wholly to the parties. It expressed no preference for
particular mechanisms of conflict prevention or mitigation. As
Oppenheim declared bluntly in 1905, “the question as to the causes of
war is of minor importance for the Law of Nations, although not for
international ethics.”52 Steven Neff has described traditional peace
agreements as involving “crowns, territories, fortresses, colonies,
economic privileges and the like assiduously traded about by statesmen
like so many hogsheads of tobacco or boatloads of slaves.”53 These
agreements rarely ascribed responsibility for a conflict or sought,
perhaps in pursuit of a “just” outcome, to restore the status quo ante
bellum.54 In his 1895 treatise, John Westlake described international
law’s agnosticism toward resolving the substance of interstate disputes,
which in his telling appears equal parts wise policy and institutional
weakness:
[I]t is only in very simple or flagrant cases that law can be in a
position to appreciate the merits of the further objects
developed in the course of a war, and even then it has no
means of making its voice heard except by the intervention of
some third power, which is as likely to be stimulated by
interest as by justice. It has therefore nothing more to do than
to accept the parties as they again present themselves to it, in
the condition and with the relations which they have
determined for themselves in concluding peace.55
Even when the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes codified conflict resolution mechanisms, which provided for
mediation prior to the onset of conflict, the role of the mediator was
described in value-neutral terms: “The part of the mediator consists in
reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of
resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance.”56

solution of international political conflicts.” GERARD J. MANGONE, A SHORT HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 58 (Joseph P. Harris ed., McGraw Hill, 1954).
52 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 69.
53 NEFF, supra note 36, at 116.
54 See id. at 118, 210–11.
55 II JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: WAR 53 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1907).
56 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes Title II, art.
4, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, U.N.T.S. 392. This language was unchanged in the 1907
version of the Convention.
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This disinclination to address root causes was also evident in the
way international law treated breaches of peace agreements. The treaty
obligations were interpreted in the narrowest possible terms, leaving
open a broad set of circumstances in which provocations by one party
might be seen as raising “new” disputes, giving rise to new rights of
armed response. Enumerating all the ways states might return to war
without violating their obligations under prior peace treaties, Wheaton
wrote (almost oxymoronically) that “perpetual peace and amity
between the parties does not imply that they are never again to make
war against each other for any cause whatever.”57 The treaties were
narrowly drawn contracts and delicts beyond their four corners were
fair game for the resumption of conflict.
Given a winning state’s freedom to annex the losing state and
forego a peace treaty altogether (unnecessary, since the other party
would soon cease to exist), a lack of normative models for resolution
short of annexation was hardly surprising. IAC agreements thus might
be wholly backward-looking, seeking compensation and punishment for
the provocations that led to the war just ended, but with no provisions
designed to prevent another. As will be seen, this agnosticism on root
causes stands in stark contrast to the international community’s
contemporary approach to NIACs.
F. Conclusions on Traditional Party Autonomy
In sum, international law of the nineteenth century permitted
warring states a degree of autonomy in structuring peace agreements
that eschewed any interest in the form or substance of the terms of
peace. States could use force to annex losing parties or use the threat of
annexation to coerce favorable treaty terms. Those terms could be
compensatory or punitive or both. Treaty negotiations involved only
states, and, at least in Europe, third states assisting mediating
negotiations did so in pursuit of their national interests.
III. IAC AGREEMENTS’ SIGNALING FUNCTION
The second legal function of nineteenth century IAC peace
agreements was their role in signaling the transition from wartime to
peacetime. This signaling function was generic to all peace agreements.

57 WHEATON, supra note 27, at 707. Wheaton took this cramped reasoning to its
furthest extreme, arguing that even “if the grievances which originally kindled the war
be repeated,” this would “furnish a new injury and a new cause of war.” Id. Breaches of
a peace agreement that would not justify renewed conflict were apparently hard to come
by.
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Treaties announced the end of wartime no matter the terms of peace
they prescribed for the belligerents.
The nineteenth century law of war was highly formalized. In stark
contrast to contemporary humanitarian law whose application is
triggered by the crossing of specific factual thresholds—a certain level
of armed conflict or effective control exerted by an occupying power, for
example—nineteenth century law relied heavily on official government
statements of intention.58 These proclamations demarcated abrupt
legal transitions between wartime and peacetime. As Fenwick put it,
“[t]he state, or status, of war represents, therefore, the new legal
relations arising between two or more states engaged in war.”59 The
new wartime regime was all encompassing, as a declaration of war
“suspends all intercourse, political, social, commercial, except so far as
intercourse is required by the purposes of war itself.”60 The binary
categories of war and peace covered many of the same areas, including
diplomatic relations, treaties, the treatment of aliens, and freedom of
navigation on the high seas. Whether a state found itself in the war or
peace paradigm determined the application of very different legal
standards on each of these issues. Writers emphasized the importance
of both enemy and neutral states receiving notice through public
declarations so they could adjust to the demands of the new paradigm.61
The commencement of war—triggering the first move from peace
to war—required a public statement. The 1907 Hague Peace
Conference produced an entire treaty on the commencement of
hostilities, which provided that war must not commence “without
previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war,
giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of

58 For the initiation of war, the 1878 edition of Halleck’s treatise observed that all
leading scholars “agree that there should be some manifesto, declaration, or publication
made within the territory of the State which declares the war, announcing the existence
of hostilities.” See HALLECK, supra note 31, at 476.
59 FENWICK, supra note 1, at 429; see also CHINKIN & KALDOR, supra note 5, at 339.
60 WOOLSEY, supra note 21, at 271–72.
61 See, e.g., BART, supra note 31, at 477 (“[N]eutral States have a right to know, by
some formal and authoritative act, that hostilities exist in form as well as in fact, on
account of the interests of their own subjects, whose duties and relations to the
belligerents are essentially changed by the new condition of things.”).
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war.”62 Communication with neutral states was equally important.63
While practice both before and after the Hague Convention was
inconsistent, leading some to promote an objective view of when war
commenced, most scholars supported a trigger that in one way or
another focused on the articulated intentions of the states in conflict.64
Peace agreements, whatever their specific provisions, signaled the
second shift: wartime had ended and peacetime reinstated.65 “Since
‘war’ was a formal business, it also needed to be formally terminated.”66
States failing to recognize that transition might both lose benefits
provided by the peace paradigm and commit legal wrongs by continuing
to act as if war was ongoing. Knowing whether a state was in war or
peace thus assumed a critical importance and took up much space in
international laws treatises of the nineteenth century.
The war-to-peace transition covered two sets of interstate
relations. The first was between or among belligerents themselves.
Normal treaty relations, which had been either terminated or
suspended during wartime, were reinstated after a peace agreement.67
Prisoners of war must be released.68 The possibility of recovering
captured property ended unless the peace treaty provided otherwise.69
The possibility of war crimes prosecutions also came to an end.70 “If
nothing be said [in the treaty] about the conquered country or places,
they remain with the conqueror, and his title cannot afterwards be

62 Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907
[hereinafter Hague Hostilities Convention]; see also FENWICK, supra note 1, at 456 (“It is
an old and well established principle of international law that a state must not resort to
forcible procedure against its opponent without giving due warning that hostilities are
about to commence.”).
63 Hague Hostilities Convention, supra note 62, at art. 2 (“The existence of a state of
war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in
regard to them until after the receipt of a notification.”).
64 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 38 (1963).
65 See LASSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (Longmans, Green and Co., 2d ed.
1912) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM 1912].
66 Marko Milanovic, The End of Application of International Humanitarian Law, 96
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 163, 167 (2014) [hereinafter Milanovic, The End of Application].
67 The older view was that war entirely abrogated treaties between belligerent
states. At the end of the nineteenth century a rival theory appeared that war merely
suspended treaties. But all sources agreed that whatever the nature of the interruption,
a peace agreement reinstated prior treaty relations between belligerent states. See The
Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties: An Examination of Practice and Doctrine, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/550 (Feb. 1, 2005), at 12–13; Harvard Research, supra note 29, at 1183–89;
FENWICK, supra note 1, at 441–44.
68 OPPENHEIM 1912, supra note 65, at 330.
69 WHEATON, supra note 27, at 711.
70 HALL, supra note 20, at 617; OPPENHEIM 1912, supra note 65, at 334–35.
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called in question.”71 An army of occupation may “levy no more
contributions or requisitions during such time as may elapse [after a
peace treaty] before it evacuates the country.”72
The second set of relations was between the belligerents and third
states. This was the law of neutrality. Once a war commenced, third
states had the choice of remaining neutral, in which case they assumed
obligations not to assist the belligerent states in a variety of ways, or
providing assistance and joining the conflict as a belligerent party.73 The
obligations of neutrals were extensive and required affirmative action
(such as ensuring their territory was not used to assist a belligerent
state) in addition to abstaining from direct assistance. All obligations
ceased upon the completion of a peace treaty. Neutrals were free to
resume normal relations with the formerly warring states without fear
their actions would deem them belligerents.
In sum, international law of the nineteenth century anchored much
doctrine in the act of peace treaties being concluded but granted the
parties virtually unlimited autonomy in negotiating their substance. In
both instances, a legal fiction was at work. For the signaling function, it
was the instantaneous change from peace to war indicated by a treaty’s
conclusion. For party autonomy, it was that a defeated state gave
consent to draconian terms. One way to understand the new era of NIAC
agreements, discussed in the following sections, is as an abandonment
of these fictions and a focus instead on the facts of an armed conflict and
the actual effect of peace agreements on individuals in states emerging
from internal conflict.
IV. THE DECLINE OF IAC PEACE AGREEMENTS IN FACT AND LAW
Starting in the early twentieth century, the status of IAC
agreements just described began to recede. This was not because the
agreements failed to offer sufficient advantages to the parties. Rather,
their decline was due to (a) the decline of IACs themselves, (b) erosion
of the extreme autonomy that nineteenth century international law
afforded peace treaty parties, and (c) the virtual evaporation in
international law of the need to signal a transition from war to peace.74
WHEATON, supra note 27, at 708; HALL, supra note 20, at 621.
HALL, supra note 20, at 579.
73 The obligations of neutrals in land warfare were codified in the Fifth Hague
Convention of 1907. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, U.S.T.S. 540, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp.
117 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910). For a detailed contemporary overview, see
OPPENHEIM 1912, supra note 65, at 333–39.
74 The fading legal significance of IAC peace agreements may also be attributable to
the decline in conflicts between major powers. The signaling function of IAC agreements
71
72
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A. IAC Decline and NIAC Ascendance in Conflicts and Peace
Agreements
First, IACs themselves have become rare. IACs exceeded the
number of NIACs throughout most of the nineteenth century, as Figure
1 demonstrates.75 NIACs were hardly a distinct minority, actually
exceeding the number of IACs in several decades. But after reaching a
high point from 1897 to 1906, IACs never again exceeded NIACs, even
in the bloody World War II decade. In the post-World War II era, NIACs
have dominated by orders of magnitude. As Figure 2 shows, after 1946
the number of IACs at any one time never rose above five, while twentyfive to forty ongoing NIACs in a given year was not unusual.76 Many
attribute the rise of NIACs to the large number of volatile post-colonial
states entering the international community starting in the late 1950s.77
Whatever the cause, “[v]ery few state-on-state militarized conflicts
remain, and most of the conflicts around the world are intrastate
insurgencies and civil wars, some of which have become
internationalized.”78

solidified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the major European powers
were frequently at war. But as Levy and Thompson reported in 2011, a “great power
war has not occurred for over half a century, marking the longest period of great power
peace for at least five centuries.” JACK S. LEVY & WILLIAM R. THOMPSON, THE ARC OF WAR 7
(2011).
75 MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR: A DATA GUIDE TO
INTER-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, INTRA-STATE, AND NON-STATE WARS, 1816-2007, at 564 fig.7.4
(2010) (Chapter titled What Do We Know About War?, written by Meredith Sarkees)
(utilizing data from the Correlates of War Project).
76 Figure 2 is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. See State-Based: Armed Conflicts by Conflict Type and Year (1946-2019), UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, https://
ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/graphs/pdf_20/armedconf_by_type.pdf (last visited Oct.
14, 2021).
77 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 75, at 564.
78 THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., CONFLICT TRENDS AND CONFLICT DRIVERS: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL CONFLICT PATTERNS AND FUTURE CONFLICT PROJECTIONS 1 (RAND
Corp. 2017).
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Trends in peace agreements followed suit, though linear
developments over the past two centuries are difficult to trace given
that a single, comprehensive dataset for this period does not appear to
exist. Quincy Wright created his own somewhat idiosyncratic dataset in
1970, which shows a steady increase in IAC agreements until World War
I, followed by a steep drop-off:
Wars were ended by peace treaty with increasing frequency
until World War I. One-third were so ended in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, half in the eighteenth century,
two-thirds in the nineteenth century, and six-sevenths—all
international wars—in the twentieth century before 1920.
Only half were so ended in the interwar period, and none since
World War II.79
Similarly, Tanisha Fazal’s data from 2013 shows that while 70 percent
of IACs ending before 1950 were terminated by peace agreements (forty
out of fifty-six), only 15 percent of IACs from 1950 to 2013 ended by
agreement (six out of thirty-eight).80
Because the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Conflict Termination
Dataset begins in 1945, data for both types of agreement in the postWorld War II period is clearer.81 As Figure 3 illustrates, peace
agreements ending IACs were relatively rare between 1946 and 2013,
with only thirteen total. By contrast, there were forty-one peace
agreements ending NIACs during the same period. The proliferation of
NIAC agreements is a more recent phenomenon. “Historically, civil wars
were fought to the finish, with the complete military defeat of the losing
side.”82
Until the 1970s, IAC agreements outnumbered NIAC
agreements, though both were rare. Beginning in the 1970s, NIAC
agreements became more frequent and started to outnumber IAC
agreements (six versus three, respectively, during that decade). In the
1990s, there were eighteen NIAC agreements, more than all IAC
agreements during the entire post-war era. Thirteen NIAC agreements
followed in the 2000s.

79 Quincy Wright, How Hostilities Have Ended: Peace Treaties and Alternatives, 392
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 51, 53 (1970).
80 Fazal, supra note 22, at 710.
81 UPPSALA
CONFLICT
DATA
PROGRAM,
Disaggregated
Datasets,
https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#termination (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
The UCDP dataset codes three types of conflicts: “international armed conflicts,” “internal armed conflicts” and “internationalized internal armed conflicts.” The data shown
in Figure 3 combine the last two categories into one “internal armed conflict” category.
82 Lise Morjé Howard & Alexandra Stark, How Civil Wars End: The International
System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors, 42 INT’L SEC. 127, 127 (2017).
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Figure 383

To illustrate these trends further, Figure 4 plots peace agreements
ending both types of conflicts as a percentage of the total number of
peace agreements in each decade. IAC agreements predominated in the
1940s (100 percent), 1950s (50 percent), and 1960s (83 percent). But
from the 1970s onward, IAC agreements comprised between 67 percent
and 100 percent of the total peace agreements during the decades
ending in 2010.84

Gaps indicate decades where no peace agreements were recorded. The first
recorded peace agreement between 1946 and 2013 was in 1946, which ended an
international armed conflict; the last recorded peace agreement was in 2012, which also
ended an international armed conflict. The first and last recorded peace agreements
ending non-international armed conflicts were in 1958 and 2008, respectively. Between
2010 and 2013 (the 2010s decade), when the UCDP dataset ends, there were no
recorded peace agreements ending non-international armed conflicts and only one
ending an international armed conflict (in 2012). For information on the dataset used
for this figure, see Joakim Kreutz, How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, 47 J. PEACE RESOL. 243 (2010).
84 In recent years the pace of NIAC agreements has slowed, with only one final
agreement (in Columbia) recorded by UCDP from 2015 to 2018. Therése Pettersson et
al., Organized Violence, 1989–2018 and Peace Agreements, 56 J. PEACE RSCH. 589, 594
(2019).
83
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Figure 4

B. Decline in IAC Parties’ Treaty-Making Autonomy
Second, international law has substantially limited the free reign
states traditionally enjoyed in negotiating IAC agreements. Nineteenth
century IAC agreements could serve as normal tools of statecraft,
unconstrained by legal limits on the force or the substance of their
terms. That virtually unlimited autonomy has eroded on many fronts.
The 1945 U.N. Charter prohibited the aggressive use of force.85 For
peace agreements, the critical point is that the distinction between the
lawful and unlawful use of force became mirrored in doctrine on
coerced treaties: only treaties procured “by the threat or use of force in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations” are void ab initio.86 A peace agreement imposed
by force on an unlawful aggressor (by, say, a state acting in self-defense)
85 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”).
86 Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 52. This reading is bolstered by Article
75, providing that all provisions of the Vienna Convention, including the nullity of coerced treaties, are “without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may
arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the
Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State’s aggression.”
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would appear permissible, whereas an aggressor state cannot impose a
treaty on its victim.87 State boundaries occupy a particularly privileged
position in Charter law, which creates a high bar to claims that they have
been consensually altered.88 State responsibility law obligates third
states not to recognize situations created by breaches of peremptory
norms, such as the annexation of territory.89 In sum, peace agreements
procured by aggressive force, especially those finalizing the annexation
of territory, are now unlawful.
Party autonomy has also been practically constrained by the
Security Council, which can interpose itself into the termination of IACs.
First, the Council can (and has) condemned virtually all the ways states
can leverage superior force in peace negotiations to obtain favorable
terms: territorial conquest, the looting or destruction of national
patrimony, mass expulsions, the slaughter of civilians, favoring or
disfavoring particular ethnic groups, etc.90 Second, the Council can itself
dictate the terms of peace without involving the parties. Resolution 687,
ending the Iraq-Kuwait war, resembled a peace agreement in its
comprehensive settlement of issues underlying the conflict. While such
resolutions are rare and frequently less than comprehensive,91 the
possibility of the Council backstop against an aggressor state imposing
harsh terms of peace serves as a disincentive for maximalist negotiating
tactics. Such a deterrent simply did not exist in the pre-Charter era.
87 Serena Forlati, Coercion as a Ground Affecting the Validity of Peace Treaties, in THE
LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 320, 321 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011)
(“[P]eace treaties imposed by the victim of an aggression, or after recourse to force is
decided by the Security Council in the exercise of its powers under Chapter VII, do not
fall within the scope of Article 52.”).
88 THOMAS D. GRANT, AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE 103–31 (2015).
89 Id. at 136–39.
90 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, ¶ 1 (Aug. 2, 1990) (condemning Iraqi invasion of Kuwait);
S.C. Res. 2347, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 2017) (Council “[d]eplores and condemns the unlawful
destruction of cultural heritage, inter alia destruction of religious sites and artefacts, as
well as the looting and smuggling of cultural property from archaeological sites,
museums, libraries, archives, and other sites, in the context of armed conflicts, notably
by terrorist groups.”); S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 6 (Apr. 16, 1993) (condemning ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia); S.C. Res. 2573, ¶ 1 (Apr. 27, 2021) (Council “[s]trongly condemns attacks in
situations of armed conflicts directed against civilians as such and other protected
persons or civilian objects.”); S.C. Res. 2134, ¶ 37 (Jan. 28, 2014) (In Central African
Republic, Council alarmed by “the increasing cycle of violence and retaliation and
degeneration into a countrywide religious and ethnic divide” and imposing sanctions on
individuals involved in planning, directing or committing “ethnic- or religious-based
attacks.”).
91 Dinstein identifies only two examples of the Council ordering a ceasefire between
IAC parties: Resolution 54 on Israel’s war of independence and Resolution 687 on the
Iraq-Kuwait conflict. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 57–59. More often, “the Council has
tended to act as a fire-brigade, viewing its paramount task as an attempt to extinguish
the blaze rather than dealing with all the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 59.
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Finally, the decline of lawful autonomy during warfare, through
codification of jus in bello norms, may be an additional reason for the
rarity of IAC peace agreements. As Tanisha Fazal has argued, the
thickening web of jus in bello obligations has raised the cost of being in
a formal state of war.92 Humanitarian law norms emerging in the midnineteenth century both imposed compliance costs and provided for
compensation to state victims. Avoiding those costs entailed both
denying that “war” commenced at the outset and avoiding a peace treaty
at the end of hostilities, which would signal that war had just
concluded.93 Peace treaties, Fazal points out,
constitute a clear signal that a belligerent has been in a state
of war, whereas avoiding a peace treaty maintains some
ambiguity. Thus, as codified jus in bello has proliferated over
the past century and a half, states may prefer to avoid
concluding formal peace treaties as a legal strategy to
decrease the likelihood of paying the costs of compliance and
the price of noncompliance.94
With these disincentives to conclude peace agreements, IAC victors
simply have fewer vehicles to impose legally dubious terms of peace.
C. Decline of IAC Agreements’ Signaling Function
Third, IAC peace agreements’ signaling function, arguably their
central external purpose in nineteenth century international law, has
faded from legal relevance.
1. Decline of the War-Peace Distinction
The war-peace distinction, providing the critical signaling role for
IAC agreements, has effectively ceased to exist. The very term “war”
“appears to have lost almost all its legal significance” and has been
replaced with the descriptively more nuanced phrase, “armed
conflict.”95 As with many areas of domestic law, international law has
discarded the rigid formalism underlying the war-peace distinction in
favor of fact-based triggers for the temporal application of legal regimes.
Fazal, supra note 22, at 696.
Id. at 701 (“Peace treaties provide windows of accountability where violations of
law can be tallied and punished.”).
94 Id. at 702. Fazal emphasizes she is “not arguing that jus in bello does not apply if
a war is unaccompanied by a peace treaty and/or a state of war is not acknowledged by
one or more belligerents.” Id. at 701. Rather, it is that application of the jus in bello is
sometimes unclear, and states generally “prefer to remain in the vaguer areas of the law,
and concluding a peace treaty would eliminate this vagueness.” Id.
95 Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 INT’L
& COMPAR. L.Q. 283, 304, 305 (1987).
92
93
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The modern conception of war, which Yoram Dinstein describes as “war
in the material sense” (as opposed to the older “war in the technical
sense”), unfolds “regardless of any formal steps.”96 War in the material
sense “is contingent only on the application of comprehensive interstate
armed force, even in the absence of a declaration of war.”97 The end of
armed conflict similarly turns on the cessation of hostilities, however
complicated that may be to ascertain, not a formal treaty of peace.98 The
formal system relied on a state’s publicly stated intention to trigger the
applicable category. As international law developed a thicker web of
norms regulating armed conflict and created institutions tasked with its
enforcement, a self-judging system of whether “war” was ongoing
became anachronistic.
The war-peace distinction was most obviously incompatible with
the jus ad bellum of the U.N. Charter. In the pre-Charter era, the
transition from peace to war involved no legal sanction. The new
categories of lawful and unlawful force created by Article 2(4) simply do
not map on to the old distinction. With aggressive force now prohibited,
as Elihu Lauterpacht observed, “there was to be no room for the
argument about whether or not the hostilities amounted to ‘war.’”99
States could not choose to take advantage of specialized “war” rules if
the act triggering those rules was unlawful, for “to allow an aggressor to
create a state of war, and thus acquire rights against neutral countries
and the victim of aggression, would be to allow the aggressor to benefit
from his own wrongful act.”100 This logic apparently resonated with
states, as the introduction of limitations on the use of force coincided
with a steep decline in declarations of war and assertions of neutral
rights.101
But one might also say the old and new conceptions of war simply
talk past each other. This view is most apparent in the move from
unilateral to collective determinations on the legality of force. The new
DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 12.
Id. at 12.
98 There are circumstances in which modern humanitarian law continues to apply
even after full hostilities have ended, such as during an occupation. IHL may also apply
when sporadic violence or troop movements continue after general hostilities have
ceased. See MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 190–93 (2019).
99 Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the State of War, 62 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 58, 62 (1968).
100 Greenwood, supra note 95, at 288; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 99, at 63
(“There is, one may venture to suggest, a genuine measure of absurdity in suggesting
that a legal system which has excluded the right to have recourse to force should
nonetheless permit the wrongdoer to assert belligerent rights arising out of his own
wrongdoing.”).
101 Wright, supra note 79, at 54.
96
97
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Charter rules rendered the question of lawfulness a matter of applying
law to fact. A potentially unlawful aggressor could not itself make a
legality determination, which under the Charter is given first to victim
states (in exercise of a right to self-defense) and ultimately to the
Security Council.102 The Council’s determination of whether force is
unlawful and, if so, what enforcement actions should be pursued, takes
no account of whether a “war” exists. States might continue to make
unilateral statements that a war commenced or ended—as some
continued to do in the Charter era—without contributing anything to
the legality determination. For the termination of war, the Charter
introduced exogenous constraints on the parties’ ability to bargain. As
David Morriss concludes, “[t]he impact of the Charter on the war
conventions is that states no longer resort to war, continue war, or
negotiate for an end of war as co-equal actors answerable to no other
authority.”103
Finally, even at its apex, the war-peace distinction applied only to
interstate conflicts. NIACs were not “war in the technical sense” but,
absent outside intervention, matters for domestic resolution. The
contemporary predominance of NIACs has thus led the international
community to focus on conflicts the war-peace distinction never
purported to govern.
2. Changing Norms Applicable in Armed Conflict
The demise of the war-peace transition is one way the signaling
function of IAC peace agreements faded to irrelevance. A second is that
rules potentially applicable during armed conflict have themselves been
radically transformed. With only minor exceptions, those rules now
apply in both war and peacetime, are triggered by circumstances other
than peace agreements, or are simply incompatible with the modern jus
ad bellum and have effectively departed from the legal canon.
The most prominent such body of rules is human rights law, wholly
unknown in the nineteenth century. While human rights treaties apply
primarily in peacetime, they are not automatically suspended during
armed conflict, though permissible derogations in times of “emergency”
may permit some rights to be suspended during some armed
At any point, the Council can trigger its own enforcement powers by deciding a
use of force constitutes a breach of the peace, a threat to the peace, or an act of
aggression. U.N. Charter art. 39, ¶ 1. Even if the first reaction comes from a victim state
invoking the right of self-defense, that right only persists “until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter
art. 51, ¶ 1.
103 David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the
Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 801, 818 (1996).
102
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conflicts.104 International bodies have also interpreted the geographical
scope of human rights treaties to apply to conflict zones beyond the
national territory.105 In some circumstances, human rights norms may
yield to international humanitarian law (IHL) under the lex specialis
principle.106 In others, the two bodies of law may be “co-applicable.”
And in yet others, international actors have favored a pro homine
approach—applying the body of law providing the greatest degree of
individual protection.107 But none of these approaches turns on the
transition from peace to war. That transition is a given, a necessary
starting point at which the question is not whether human rights treaties
apply but how their continued operation interacts with IHL.108 In the
transition from war to peace, these questions are simply asked in
reverse.
Humanitarian law has also abandoned any necessary connection to
a formal declaration of war or agreement of peace. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions deliberately chose factual rather than formal triggers.109
For commencement, it is the existence of “armed conflict.”110 For
104 See, e.g., International Covenant in Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EMERGENCIES (Evan J. Criddle ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
105 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/21/
Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004); see also Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07,
53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589 (2011), ¶¶ 149–50. See generally MARKO MILANOVIĆ, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011).
106 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 240 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion].
107 For a thoughtful discussion of each approach, see Yuval Shany, Co-Application and
Harmonization of IHL and IHRL: Are Rumours about the Death of Lex Specialis
Premature?, HEBREW UNIV. JERUSALEM LEGAL STUD. RSCH. PAPER SERIES NO. 20-22 1 (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3646936
(forthcoming
in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (Robert Kolb ed., May 2022).
108 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 106.
109 See Milanovic, The End of Application, supra note 66, at 168 (“[T]he main point of
the 1949 Geneva reform was precisely to do away with the subjectivity and formalism
of war, and to make the thresholds of application objective and factual.”).
110 Article 2, common to all four Geneva Conventions, provides that “the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war
is not recognized by one of them.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949. Commentary to article 2 notes
that the Conventions’ drafters deliberately substituted “armed conflict” for “war” in
order to minimize “the possibility for States to evade their obligations under
humanitarian law simply by not declaring war or refusing to acknowledge the existence
of an armed conflict.” Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary of 2016 Article 2:
Application of the Convention, para. 202 (2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC
1257F7D0036B518.
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termination, it is “the general close of military operations and, in the
case of occupied territories, . . . the termination of the occupation.”111
Military operations may indeed end by a peace agreement. But “such
clear-cut situations, where military operations are terminated at precise
times, are infrequent.”112 More often, cessation must be ascertained
based on a complex assortment of facts, such as fighting that ends in one
area but not others, fighting that dies down and restarts, and acts by
belligerents that seem inconsistent with their stated intention to end
hostilities, such as continuing to detain an adversary’s combatants. But
complex facts are still facts. Humanitarian law will cease to apply, in
Marko Milanovic’s words, “once the conditions that triggered its
application in the first place no longer exist. In other words, if a
particular situation can no longer be qualified as an IAC, a NIAC[,] or an
occupation, the application of IHL will end.”113
Other norms previously triggered by a peace treaty experienced a
similar decoupling, such as the reinstatement of treaty relations, the
return of captured property, and the possibility of war crimes
prosecutions. Nineteenth century IAC treaties were understood to
reinstate treaty relations between belligerent states, which had either
been abrogated or suspended during the conflict.114 Over time,
international law came to reject the view that war ipso facto interrupted
treaty relations in any fashion, rendering their reinstatement via peace
treaty a secondary or even obsolete matter.115 Old IAC treaties
extinguished the possibility of recovering property captured by the
enemy during conflict (unless the treaty provided otherwise).116
International law now increasingly facilitates mechanisms to return
captured property in the absence of a peace treaty.117 IAC treaties

111 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 3(b), June
8, 1977; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949.
112 Emily Crawford, The Temporal and Geographic Reach of International
Humanitarian Law, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 57, 61 (Ben
Saul & Dapo Akande eds., 2020).
113 Milanovic, The End of Application, supra note 66, at 170.
114 See supra note 67 & accompanying text.
115 Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 106, 108, 112 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2) (“While the leading judgments on this matter are
not always models of clarity, it has become evident that, under contemporary
international law, the existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto put an end to or
suspend existing agreements . . . .”).
116 See OPPENHEIM 1912, supra note 65.
117 See generally Hans Das, Restoring Property Rights in the Aftermath of War, 53 INT’L
& COMPAR. L.Q. 429 (2004).
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extinguished the possibility of war crimes prosecutions.118 A host of ad
hoc, hybrid, and permanent international criminal tribunals now allows
for prosecutions years after conflicts have ended.
Arguably the most significant change came in the law of neutrality.
Classical neutrality doctrine presented third states with a choice of
siding or not siding with states in conflict.119 Nothing in that choice
turned on the reasons for the conflict or which state had initiated
hostilities. But those questions came to form the center of the Charterbased jus ad bellum, which removed the option of states choosing to side
with an unlawful aggressor. Because the characterization of force as
lawful or unlawful became a collective decision, neutrality in the face of
aggression could not remain a choice for individual states. If a state uses
unlawful force, third states providing it assistance are complicit in the
initial unlawful act. If a state’s use of force is lawful—either as an act of
self-defense or pursuant to a Security Council authorization—third
states may remain unengaged or may assist the state using lawful force
either via collective self-defense (if the victim requests help) or
pursuant to a Council-authorized action (if the terms of the
authorization so permit). In Quincy Wright’s words, “the concept of
neutrality, which implied legal equality of the belligerents during war,
has become obsolete.”120 Many scholars agree with Wright that
neutrality is fully incompatible with the Charter’s collective security
obligations.121 Others argue that neutrality is still possible until the
Security Council has condemned a use of force.122 At that point, the
Charter’s view of the Council as an agent for member states, and its
requirement that member states follow Council decisions, would
override incompatible neutrality declarations.123
In sum, the signaling function has been superseded by a host of
developments in the jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and cognate areas of
See supra note 71 & accompanying text.
Under the Third Hague Convention, the choice of whether to side with one side in
a conflict was triggered by a declaration of war. See Hague Hostilities Convention, supra
note 62, at art. 2 (“The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a
notification . . . .”).
120 Wright, supra note 79, at 57.
121 See Charles G. Fenwick, Is Neutrality Still a Term of Present Law?, 63 AM. J. INT’L L.
100, 101–02 (1969).
122 See JAMES UPCHER, NEUTRALITY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2020) for a
discussion of neutrality and force. See also Michael Bothe, Neutrality, Concept and
General Rules, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); Marina
Mancini, The Effects of a State of War or Armed Conflict, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 988, 1003–04 (Marc Weller ed., 2015).
123 U.N. Charter arts. 24 & 25.
118
119
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international law (the law of treaties, property restitution, and
international criminal law). Neither the belligerent parties nor third
states now need peace treaties to attain benefits under these regimes.
Not surprisingly, IAC agreements have become far less common.
V. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE RISE OF NIAC AGREEMENTS
We now turn to the modern era of NIAC agreements. As we have
seen, NIAC agreements have almost wholly eclipsed IAC agreements,
comprising between 67 percent and 100 percent of total peace
agreements in the decades from 1970 to 2010.124 But numerical
predominance has not produced an equivalent legal status, or anything
close to it. While at their core IAC and NIAC agreements are structured
as contractual instruments and phrased in legalistic terms, NIAC
agreements otherwise ceased to resemble their IAC predecessors. IAC
agreements served as efficient instruments of statecraft, allowing states
to embody their national interests in binding treaties regardless of
whether they were coerced or the terms were draconian. IAC
agreements also signaled the critical transition from war to peace. And
IAC agreements were treaties between states, therefore subject to the
international law of treaties. None of these attributes apply to NIAC
agreements.
But this negative view of NIAC agreements—how they are not
situated in international law—is the easy part. There is little clarity
about how, if at all, they affirmatively engage with the contemporary
international legal system. Before proposing several points of
engagement, it is worth briefly reviewing the reasons for NIAC
agreements’ uncertain legal status.
First, the internal conflicts terminated by the agreements are
themselves only partially subject to direct legal constraint. A wide
variety of acts committed in the course of NIACs can trigger application
of humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law.
But in contrast to jus ad bellum restrictions on the interstate use of force,
few contend that international law directly limits the internal resort to
force itself, either by governments suppressing rebellions or rebel
groups challenging governments.125 The U.N. Charter’s prohibition on
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Eliav Lieblich has discerned human rights limitations on governments’ resort to
internal force. Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 740–47 (2016).
Timothy Waters proposes identifying certain internal borders as the functional
equivalent of international boundaries for jus ad bellum purposes. Timothy William
Waters, Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the Georgian War Through the Distorting Lens of
Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 176, 229 (2013). The Security Council has consistently
condemned the internal use of force, potentially contributing to a nascent customary
124
125
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interstate aggression by its terms does not reach NIACs.126 As with older
belligerency doctrine, the new Charter-based law only engages with
NIACs when third parties intervene.127 Short of such a reversion to the
interstate context, the Charter regime neither prohibits uprisings
against governments nor prevents governments from responding to
such uprisings. Simply put, “there is no rule in international law against
civil wars.”128
Does the lack of an internal jus ad bellum mean that the termination
of NIACs is also beyond the regulatory scope of international law? One
can argue that NIAC peace agreements are more closely associated with
the use of internal force itself (the equivalent of the jus ad bellum in the
interstate setting) than with constraints on conduct within a NIAC (the
equivalent of the jus in bello in the interstate setting). If that typology is
correct, it would follow that the end of a NIAC has no more implications
for international law than its beginning. Why would international law
constrain or shape NIAC peace agreements when it does not speak to
norm. Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 683–84. But clear doctrine moving the
initiation and prosecution of civil war from the domestic to the international sphere has
not yet emerged. See Tom Ruys, The Quest for an Internal Jus Ad Bellum: International
Law’s Missing Link, Mere Distraction or Pandora’s Box?, in NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW 169 (Claus Kreß & Robert Lawless eds., 2020)
(“[T]here is (as yet) no ‘internal’ jus ad bellum, restraining the recourse to force between
the State, on the one hand, and rebels or insurgents, on the other hand.”).
126 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state . . . .” (emphasis added)).
127 The outcome differs considerably depending on whether an intervention
supports the government or the rebels. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ appeared to
condemn only interventions supporting rebel groups, describing support of
governments in broad and permissive terms:
[T]he principle of non-intervention derives from customary international
law. It would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if
intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made
by an opposition group in another State – supposing such a request to
have actually been made by an opposition to the regime in Nicaragua in
this instance. Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the
principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is
already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to
be allowed at the request of the opposition. This would permit any State
to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another State,
whether at the request of the government or at the request of its
opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court’s view correspond to
the present state of international law.
Military and Paramilitary Operations in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 126, ¶ 246 (June 1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. This view is highly
controversial. See Gregory H. Fox, Invitations to Intervene After the Cold War: Toward a
New Collective Model, 4 MAX PLANCK TRIALOGUES (forthcoming 2022).
128 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (7th
rev. ed. 1997).
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the initiation of conflicts they purport to resolve? On the other hand, in
the interstate setting there is no necessary connection between the
legality of force that begins a conflict and a peace agreement that ends
it. A state using unlawful force is not precluded from entering into a
peace agreement if it does not coerce the other treaty party.
Substantively, the agreement need not address the lawfulness of the
initial use of force. As with settlement agreements in domestic law,
parties are more likely to enter into peace agreements if the agreement
does not assign legal responsibility for the dispute just settled. If this is
true in the interstate setting it may also be true for NIACs, meaning the
absence of an internal jus ad bellum need not imply an absence of norms
constraining NIAC agreements. Further, as will be discussed below,
many NIAC agreements do in fact address jus in bello-like issues, such as
responsibility for human rights and humanitarian law violations. So
NIAC agreements may be substantively closer to those aspects of NIACs
that are subject to direct legal constraints.
But neither outcome provides much guidance on how we might
conceptualize legal regulation of NIAC agreements. If the agreements
are grouped with the internal use of force, there are simply no norms
potentially applicable. That grouping just begs the question of how, if at
all, international law constrains the agreements themselves. If they are
grouped with conduct during NIACs, those norms would at best address
only some of the issues covered by peace agreements, and then only
provisions concerning accountability for past conduct. They would not
address the arguably more significant prospective reforms in the postconflict state, as well as the validity of the agreements themselves.
The second reason for uncertainty on the direct application of
international law to the agreements is closely related: no consensus
exists on whether NIAC agreements are legally binding. The Vienna
Convention on the Law Treaties (“VCLT”) defines a treaty in Article 2 as
an agreement between “states.”129 Because at least one party to a NIAC
agreement is necessarily a non-state actor, usually a rebel group, these
agreements do not meet this traditional definition. None of the post1990 NIAC agreements listed in the author’s new peace agreement
dataset is registered as a “treaty” with the U.N. Secretariat, a finding
consistent with the Secretary-General’s policy of not registering any
agreement under Article 102 of the Charter unless it meets the VCLT
definition.130
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2.
The dataset was compiled by the author for a forthcoming article on NIAC
agreements’ incorporation of international law. Article 102(1) of the U.N. Charter
provides that “[e]very treaty and every international agreement entered into by any
129
130
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But the Vienna Convention also left room for the legal subjectivity
of non-state groups to evolve, a process well beyond the law of treaties.
Article 3 states that failure to meet the Article 2 definition does not affect
the binding force of agreements “between States and other subjects of
international law.”131 Are rebel groups “subjects of international
law?”132 They certainly are for purposes of some humanitarian law
rights and obligations.133 The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that
they are not for treaty purposes in its 2004 Kallon and Kamara
decision.134 That opinion has been heavily criticized.135 An arbitral
tribunal in the Abyei case similarly held that agreements between Sudan
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army were not
treaties.136 Taking an intermediate position, the Constitutional Court of
Columbia held that armed groups could acquire international legal
personality for purposes of international humanitarian law but not for
public international law generally.137 As a result, agreements between
NIAC parties “are not, strictly speaking, treaties, as they are not
established between entities subject to public international law but
between the parties to an internal conflict.”138
The third reason for uncertainty about direct legal engagement
with NIACs is the disputed nature of Security Council involvement in the
conflicts. Through a series of resolutions over the decades since the end
Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon
as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.” U.N. Charter art. 102,
¶ 1. The Secretary-General’s policy is set out in the U.N. Treaty Handbook. U.N. TREATY
SECTION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, TREATY HANDBOOK, §5.3, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.1
(2012).
131 Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
132 National liberation groups fighting against colonial authorities constitute a
special case not applicable to all rebel groups. See Daragh Murray, Non-State Armed
Groups and Peace Agreements: Examining Legal Capacity and the Emergence of
Customary Rules, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACE SETTLEMENTS 187, 196–97 (Mark Weller
et al. eds., 2020).
133 See generally NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Math Noortmann et al. eds.,
2015).
134 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (Mar. 13, 2004).
135 See Bell, Peace Agreements Nature and Legal Status, supra note 8, at 387–88; see
also Antonio Cassese, The Special Court and International Law: The Decision Concerning
the Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1130, 1130–32 (2004).
136 Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Abyei Final Award,
July 22, 2009, ¶ 427.
137 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, Sentencia C225/95, ¶ 14, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1995/c-225-95.htm.
An abridged English translation is available at https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/colombia-constitutional-conformity-protocol-ii.
138 Id. at ¶ 17.
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of the Cold War, the Security Council effectively created a de facto
regulatory regime for NIACs. If this Council-led regime were
understood as contributing to customary international law on issues
such as the binding nature of NIAC peace agreements or an internal jus
ad bellum, then the susceptibility of NIACs to legal constraint would be
substantially enhanced. But if the Council is understood as an
essentially political body, whose resolutions bind only their conflictspecific targets and do not constitute evidence of broader custom, then
the traditional dearth of norms remains.
The basis for this debate is the Council having responded to NIACs
more frequently and in more varied ways than any other international
actor in the post-Cold War era. The Council (usually via Chapter VII of
the Charter) has demanded parties cease fighting (a de facto internal jus
ad bellum); sought an end to human rights and humanitarian law
violations; approved peace negotiations and peace agreements;
demanded that parties adhere to those agreements; sanctioned
agreement violators; and dispatched peacekeeping missions to oversee
implementation of agreements.139 One recent study found that the
Council passed at least one resolution on 76 percent of all NIACs ongoing
since 1990.140 On the specific question of whether parties must adhere
to NIAC agreements, the same study found that 50 percent of NIACs
since 1990 had at least one peace agreement and that the Council
ordered non-state parties to abide by agreements in 83 percent of those
conflicts.141 In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter, “demanded” that all parties comply
with a ceasefire. Referring to two peace accords, it emphasized that
“there can be no military solution to the crisis and that the full
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements
remains the only way to resolve the crisis persisting in the country.”142
The Council imposed sanctions for violations of NIAC agreements in the
cases of Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DR of
Congo.143

139 For many examples of such actions, see THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2010).
140 Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 663; see also Laura Edwards & Jonathan
Worboys, The Interpretation and Implementation of Peace Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PEACE SETTLEMENTS, supra note 132, at 111, 114–17 (Mark Weller et al. eds.,
2020) (discussing Council endorsement of peace agreements).
141 Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 676–77.
142 S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 3 (Nov. 15, 2004).
143 S.C. Res. 1521, ¶ 2(a) (Dec. 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 5, 14(b)–(c) (May 17, 1994);
S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 6–7 (Nov. 15, 2004); S.C. Res. 1596, ¶ 1 (May 3, 2005).
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The arguments for treating this Council practice as evidence of
customary law are beyond the scope of this Article.144 But if those
arguments were accepted, and Council practice were thereby added to
existing state practice, the claim supporting a binding view of NIAC
agreements would be substantially strengthened.
Together, these three complications present real barriers to
contemporary international law directly constraining or otherwise
regulating NIAC agreements. But in the following Sections, this Article
will argue that this search for an appropriate doctrinal niche is a journey
down the wrong road. NIAC agreements have not stepped into the shoes
of their IAC predecessors as legally binding vehicles by which subjects
of international law—in that case, states—may effectuate their
interests. A review of relevant practice suggests contemporary NIAC
agreements are the object, rather than the subject, of norms and
institutions. NIAC agreements have indeed engaged international law,
but indirectly as the epicenter of a system of cognate norms and as the
vehicle for collective rather than national responses to the most
prevalent form of conflict. The next two sections describe these new
modes of indirect engagement.
VI. THE NEW ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN NIAC AGREEMENTS
A. Why a Governance Focus?
The first means of engagement revolves around issues of
governance. The quality of governing institutions in post-conflict states
has been crucial to the durability of peace agreements. IAC agreements
can seek to achieve peace in two ways: (1) by physically separating the
parties across recognized borders and (2) employing the reciprocal
levers of interstate relations to compel and incentivize peaceful
behavior. NIAC agreements cannot follow suit. In post-NIAC states,
governments and rebel groups must live side-by-side on the same
territory and remain subject to the same laws and political institutions.
Further, the leverage available to one state seeking advantageous terms
in an IAC agreement, or trying to hold another state to its peace treaty
obligations, is rarely available to rebel groups opposing vastly better
resourced governmental parties.145 International institutions—whose
assistance and sanctioning capacity might be analogized to the carrots
and sticks available to IAC parties—are not automatically available to
144

729.

The arguments are set out in detail in Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 692–

145 Barbara F. Walter, Bargaining Failures and Civil War, 12 ANN. REV. POLI. SCI. 243,
246 (2009).
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level this playing field. They address NIACs only if the parties choose to
include them in a peace process, or if the Security Council imposes
obligations under Chapter VII of the Charter.
As a result, NIAC agreements must be largely inward-looking—
reforming domestic laws and institutions, even drafting new
constitutions—to displace modes of governance whose legitimacy was
shattered during years of conflict.146 In the words of the 2005 Sudanese
Comprehensive Agreement, “successful implementation of the CPA shall
provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that will help create a
solid basis to preserve peace and make unity attractive . . . .”147 This
move to more open and inclusive governance embodies the frequently
criticized liberal model of peace building.148 But even the model’s critics
take much of their ammunition from the degree of consensus the liberal
governance model has achieved.149
The logic is straightforward. If “most civil wars are fundamentally
about power, who governs, how and over whom,”150 agreements ending
civil wars must address political power issues head-on. As Mimmi
Söderberg Kovacs observed, “because internal conflicts begin with the
breakdown of normal politics, the conflict resolution process should
entail the establishment of mechanisms that allow the conflict to shift
from violence back to politics.”151 Reviewing NIAC agreements since
1990, Christine Bell describes a wide range of political power-sharing
arrangements comprising “a new ‘power-map’ for how power is to be

146 BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE, supra note 8, at 105 (“Framework peace agreements
reflect a common approach to settlement design that links ceasefires to agreed new
political and legal arrangements for the holding and exercising of power.”). Sometimes
the new regimes are transitional, though nonetheless still sweeping in their reforms. See
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 20 (Emmanuel De
Groof & Micha Wiebusch eds., 2020).
147 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
at xii (Jan. 1, 2005), https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/337.
148 See generally NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING (Edward Newman, Roland
Paris & Oliver P. Richmond, eds. 2009).
149 See Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Review Essay: Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding,
15 CIV. WARS 242, 242 (2013) (Authors under review, largely critical of the liberal
approach, “concur that the liberal peace paradigm is the dominant form of
internationally supported peacebuilding.”).
150 Anders Themnér & Thomas Ohlson, Legitimate Peace in Post-Civil War States:
Towards Attaining the Unattainable, 14 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 61, 63 (2014).
151 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in
Post-War Politics, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACEBUILDING 134, 136 (Anna
K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk eds., 2008).
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held and exercised.”152 These reconceptions of state authority range
from the accommodation of identity groups in nation-wide settlements
to altering relations between central governments and sub-state groups
to “[t]ransitional interim power-sharing focused on moving from
conflict and authoritarianism towards democratic modes of
government.”153 They can involve creating new institutions or
redefining the role of existing institutions, endowing individuals with
rights, recognizing new group rights and creating accountability
procedures. Many contain commitments to a menu of liberal
democratic reforms.154 New electoral norms and institutions, for
example, featured prominently in agreements for Angola, Bangladesh,
Sudan, and Cambodia.155 Provisions on the independence of the
judiciary were present in the Central African Republic, El Salvador, and

152 CHRISTINE BELL, POLITICAL POWER-SHARING AND INCLUSION: PEACE AND TRANSITION
PROCESSES 9 (2018), https://psrpdev.law.ed.ac.uk/psrpx/wp-content/uploads/2020/
02/Political-Power-Sharing-Report-DIGITAL.pdf.
153 Id. at 21.
154 The Arusha Peace Plan for Burundi, for example, announced the “[i]nstitution of
a new political, economic, social and judicial order in Burundi, in the context of a new
constitution inspired by Burundian realities and founded on the values of justice, the
rule of law, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, equality between women and men,
mutual understanding and tolerance among the various political and ethnic components
of the Burundian people.” Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi,
Protocol I, ch. II, art. 5(1), Aug. 28, 2000, http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/
accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord____.pdf [hereinafter Arusha Agreement]. In the Sun City
Agreement for DR of Congo, the parties affirmed “the need to build a real democracy in
the Congo and system of rule of law, based on the principle of the separation of powers
and the balance between institutions, as well as adherence to the Constitution and the
law” and that “democracy implies mainly, within a sovereign nation, the participation of
the people in the exercise of power in a system of political pluralism, transparency in
the management of public affairs, [and] good governance[.]” Inter-Congolese Political
Negotiations: The Final Act, Resolution No: DIC/CPJ/03, Apr. 2, 2003, https://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf
[hereinafter Sun City Agreement].
155 See Lusaka Protocol, Annex 7, Nov. 15, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1441, at 42–44,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AO_941115_Lusaka
Protocol%28en%29.pdf; Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, art. (B)(4)-(10), (C)(1)-(6), Dec.
2, 1997, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BD_971202_Chitta
gong%20Hill%20Tracts%20Peace%20Accord.pdf; The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, ch. II, pt. I, 1.6.2.11, July 20,
2002–Dec. 31, 2004, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_
060000_The%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf; Final Act of the Paris
Conference on Cambodia, pt. II, Oct. 23, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/46/608, S/23177,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH_911023_Framework
ComprehensivePoliticalSettlementCambodia.pdf.
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Aceh (Indonesia).156 Prohibitions on discrimination based on ethnicity,
gender, religion, and other grounds appeared in Burundi, DR of Congo,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Colombia.157 Anti-corruption provisions were
present in Angola, Northern Ireland, South Sudan and Rwanda.158 NIAC
agreements have also reconfigured relations among economic actors,
national and sub-national territorial units, military factions, and
business and governmental institutions.159 For their part, international

See Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction in the
Central African Republic, May 11, 2015, U.N. Doc. S/2015/344, https://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CF_150511_PactforPeaceReconcili
ation.pdf; Peace Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, ch. III, Jan. 16, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/46/664
& S/23501, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SV_920116_
ChapultepecAgreement.pdf [hereinafter the Chapultepec Agreement]; Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh
Movement, § 1.4.3, Aug. 15, 2005, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/ID_050815_Memorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf.
157 See Arusha Agreement, supra note 154, at Protocol I, ch. II, art. 7(1) & Protocol II,
ch. I, art. 1(1); Sun City Agreement, supra note 154; General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 6, ch. 1, art. I(14), Nov. 21,1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/
79 & S/1995/999; Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and
Lasting Peace, Introduction, Nov. 24, 2016, at 12, https://www.peaceagreements.org/
viewmasterdocument/1845.
158 See Lusaka Protocol, supra note 155, at 40; The Northern Ireland Peace
Agreement, Apr. 10, 1998, at 12, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20Agreement.pdf; Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Aug. 17, 2015, at 35,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Agreement%20on%20the
%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20Sout
h%20Sudan.pdf; Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Aug. 4, 1993, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_930804_PeaceAgreementRwanda-RwandesePatriotic
Front.pdf, at 4 (incorporating The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the
Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, Jan. 9, 1993, https://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_930109_ProtocolOnPowerSha
ring.pdf, which addresses corruption in art. 23(g)).
159 See CHRISTINE BELL, ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS (2018), https://psrpdev.law.ed.ac.uk/psrpx/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Economic-Power-Sharing-Report-DIGITAL.pdf; LAURA WISE,
TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING AND INCLUSION IN PEACE PROCESSES (2018), https://psrpdev.law.
ed.ac.uk/psrpx/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Territorial-Power-Sharing-ReportDIGITAL.pdf; CHRISTINE BELL, SAM GLUCKSTEIN, ROBERT FORSTER & JAN POSPISIL, MILITARY
POWER-SHARING AND INCLUSION IN PEACE PROCESSES (2018), https://psrpdev.law.ed
.ac.uk/psrpx/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018_Bell-Gluckstein-Forster-Pospisil_
Military-Report.pdf; SEAN MOLLOY, BUSINESS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS (2018),
https://psrpdev.law.ed.ac.uk/psrpx/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018_Molloy_
Business-Power-Sharing-Report.pdf.
156
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organizations have promoted liberal governance and institution
building in post-conflict states for almost three decades.160
The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord in Nepal exemplifies the
institutional reform ethos of recent NIAC agreements.161 The Accord
capped a turbulent fifteen-year period that began with the 1990
overthrow of Nepal’s absolute monarchy and included a bloody conflict
between the government and a Maoist insurgency beginning in 1996.162
After peace talks failed in 2001 and 2003, King Gyanendra’s coup in
2005 united the Maoists with opposition political parties and produced
sufficient pressure for a ceasefire and a final peace accord in November
2006.163
In the agreement, the parties expressed a determination “to carry
out a progressive restructuring of the state to resolve existing classbased, ethnic, regional and gender problems” and a “full commitment
towards democratic norms and values including competitive multiparty
democratic governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human
rights, full press freedom and the concept of the rule of law.”164 Among
the institutional changes to achieve these ends were divesting the king
of all political power;165 declaring the country would be governed by a
laundry list of liberal democratic principles;166 affirming a previouslydrafted interim constitution setting elections for the constituent
assembly;167 committing to guarantee civil, political, economic, and
social rights;168 restructuring the military, including human rights

160 See MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE 1–23,
197–99 (2006).
161 See generally Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed between Nepal Government
and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Nov. 22, 2006, https://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_061122_Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement
%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CPN%20%28Maoist%
29.pdf [hereinafter Nepal Agreement].
162 WARISHA FARASAT & PRISCILLA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN NEPAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR
JUSTICE 10 (2009).
163 Nepal: Government, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/
269 (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
164 Nepal Agreement, supra note 161, at 1.
165 See id. ¶ 3.3.
166 See id. ¶ 3.4 (Parties agree to “adopt a political system that fully abides by the
universally accepted principles of fundamental human rights, multiparty competitive
democratic system, sovereignty of the people and supremacy of the people,
constitutional balance and control, rule of law, social justice, equality, independent
judiciary, periodic elections, monitoring by civil society, complete press freedom,
people’s right to information, transparency and accountability in the activities of
political parties, people’s participation, impartial, competent, and clean bureaucracy.”).
167 See id. ¶ 3.2.
168 See id. ¶¶ 7.1, 7.5.
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training;169 and establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission.170 Section 3.5 of the
Accord seemed to sum up these and other provisions as “an inclusive,
democratic and progressive restructuring of the state . . . .”171
B. Convergence with International Norms
The centrality of governance to NIAC agreements intersects with
contemporary international law in two ways. First, the choice to offer
NIAC parties a reconstructed post-conflict state follows international
law’s rejection of other, arguably more efficacious ways to end NIACs.
State building is difficult and has a notoriously mixed record.172 Many
NIAC peace agreements fail and the conflicts resume.173 Even if the
peace holds, settlements often fail to achieve the democratic transitions
called for in agreements.174 Many states arguably lack the institutional
capacity to follow through on reformist commitments.175 Some argue
the Westphalian model embodied in NIAC agreements may actually
increase conflict in post-colonial states.176 Surely there must be a better
way.
But a series of alternative approaches, all with long historical
pedigrees, are plainly inconsistent with contemporary international law
and practice, and find virtually no support in collective responses to
NIACs.177 One approach is allowing NIACs to continue until one party
achieves total victory, an option Edward Luttwak famously dubbed
“give war a chance.”178 Some data supports Luttwak, suggesting that
conflicts ending in military victory are less likely to reoccur than those

See id. ¶¶ 4.6–4.8.
See Nepal Agreement, supra note 161, ¶¶ 5.2.5, 8.2.
171 Id. ¶ 3.5.
172 See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, THE IDEOLOGY OF FAILED STATES: WHY INTERVENTION FAILS 70–
123 (2017); SÉVERINE AUTESSERRE, PEACELAND: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE EVERYDAY
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 97–158 (2014).
173 See MONICA DUFFY TOFT, SECURING THE PEACE: THE DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS
27–32 (2009).
174 See Ayokunu Adedokun, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Critical Survey of the
Literature and Avenues for Future Research 27 (UNU-MERIT, Working Paper No. 2017016, 2017) (“Out of 43 cases of negotiated settlements of civil wars from 1946 to 2005
. . . only 28 cases (65 per cent) made the transition toward democracy.”).
175 See Karl DeRouen Jr. et al., Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State
Capacity, 47 J. PEACE RSCH. 333, 333 (2010).
176 See Hendrik Spruyt, Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System,
146 DAEDALUS 112, 113 (2017).
177 I describe these in greater detail in GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 115–
140 (2008).
178 Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFFS., July/Aug., 1999, at 36.
169
170
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ended by negotiated settlements.179 But the Security Council rarely
supports this position, instead regularly demanding that NIAC parties
end hostilities regardless of the prospect of victory by one side or the
other.180 A second approach in the case of territorial-based conflicts is
secession by dissident minority groups. With few exceptions,
international organizations and most states have discouraged secession
as a solution to territorial-based conflicts.181 Security Council
resolutions addressing NIACs, for example, so frequently voice support
for states’ territorial integrity that affirmation of existing borders has
become boilerplate in all such conflicts.182 While it is hardly surprising
to find a consensus among states that unwanted changes to their
national borders should not enjoy legal support, the effect of this view
on secessions may be less known: few, if any, violent secessionist
movements since 1945 achieved their goal of separation.183
History presents a further range of more brutal options for
“resolving” internal conflicts, such as extermination of disfavored
minority groups, their subjugation into second-class citizenship, and
forcible population expulsions or exchanges. For reasons that do not
require explanation, contemporary international law forecloses each of
these options.184 None appear in any known NIAC peace agreement.
179 Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón & Syed Mansoob Murshed, ‘Give War a Chance’: All-Out
War as a Means of Ending Conflict in the Cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia, 15 CIV. WARS
281, 283, 285–87 (2013).
180 Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 683–84. Indeed, the Council has approved
interventions to assist parties on the verge of losing NIACs or struggles for political
power. In Resolution 1973 on Libya, for example, the Council authorized member states
to use force to stop a government assault on the city of Benghazi that would likely have
resulted in mass civilian casualties and crippled the rebellion against the regime of
Moamar Ghaddafi then underway. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011). See Luke
Glanville, Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent, 14 INT’L
STUD. PERSP. 325, 332–36 (2013). In the Gambia, the Council approved of an ECOWAS
intervention to support a winning presidential candidate living in exile with no troops
that might oust the losing incumbent who refused to leave office. See Claus Kreß &
Benjamin Nußberger, Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: the
Case of the Gambia in January 2017, 4 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L., 239, 241 (2017).
181 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 69
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 85, 92, 108 (1999) (“Since 1945, no State which has been created by
unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared
wishes of the government of the predecessor State.”).
182 Samuel K. N. Blay, Territorial Independence and Political Integrity, in THE MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 21 (2010).
183 Ryan D. Griffiths & Louis M. Wasser, Does Violent Secessionism Work?, 63 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1310, 1329–32 (2019) (examining 315 secessionist movements from
1900 to 2006 and “find[ing] no evidence that secessionist violence works”). Secession
with the permission of a parent state does not implicate a purported legal entitlement
to secede, since resort to a legal rationale in such cases is unnecessary.
184 FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 177, at 123–24, 136–40.
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The U.N. Secretary-General has refused to support peace agreements
that grant amnesty for the international crimes that would necessarily
attend many of these actions.185 These policy choices evidence a strong
preference for maintaining existing borders and national demographic
profiles, leaving legal and institutional reform within those borders,
designed to foster coexistence between the formerly warring parties, as
the only means of avoiding a return to hostilities.
The second way governance in NIAC agreements intersects with
contemporary international law is by drawing on norms concerned with
treatment of citizens and how the exercise of political power is
legitimized. The most obvious is human rights law.186 As Christine Bell
demonstrated in her groundbreaking work, and later scholars have
reaffirmed, NIAC agreements draw on global and regional human rights
standards to define obligations, even as they vary significantly in
whether national or supra-national bodies will enforce those
standards.187
The U.N. Secretary-General has described the
organization’s approach to peace agreements as deriving from
“international human rights law, international humanitarian law,
international criminal law and international refugee law.”188
The governance focus also parallels international law’s increasing
concern with democratic elections.189 While nominally a strand of
human rights law,190 the proposition that “[t]he will of the people shall
U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations
Approach to Transitional Justice 4 (Mar. 2010).
186 See Amanda Cahill-Ripley, Reclaiming the Peacebuilding Agenda: Economic and
Social Rights as a Legal Framework for Building Positive Peace - A Human Security Plus
Approach to Peacebuilding, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 223, 225–230 (2016); INT’L COUNCIL ON
HUM. RTS. POLICY, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE? HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS 13–14 (2006).
187 BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at ix, xiii; Corina Lacatus
& Kathryn Nash, Peace Agreements and the Institutionalisation of Human Rights: A MultiLevel Analysis, 24 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 889, 890 (2020); Jennsua Sapiano, Peace Settlements
and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACE SETTLEMENTS, supra note 132, at 655,
658 (“Human rights standards in peace agreements are often taken from international
human rights treaties to which the state may or may not be party.”).
188 U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to
Rule of Law Assistance 2 (Apr. 2008).
189 For a review of recent practice, see DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H.
Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2020). For an analysis of practice in the 1990s, see DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
190 The right to political participation appears most prominently in Article 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. In regional instruments, rights to vote and to run for political
office appear in Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights,
Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 13 of the African
185
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be the basis of the authority of government”191 has spawned a broad
practice of democracy promotion in a variety of sectors. Election
observers have become omnipresent.192 Aila Matanock argues that once
top-down international pressure after the Cold War led to an initial
spike in monitored elections, the continued spread of monitoring
became essentially self-perpetuating.193 Regional and sub-regional
organizations in Europe, Latin America, and Africa have created
“democracy protection regimes” that provide for the non-recognition of
leaders who come to power in an extra-constitutional manner.194
National recognition practice, while uneven, no longer uniformly
adheres to the traditional effective control doctrine.195
U.N.
peacekeeping missions regularly help structure and monitor elections
in post-conflict states.196 The Security Council frequently praises fair
elections, condemns those it views as failing to meet international
standards of fairness, and calls out by name individuals who won or lost

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Council of Europe, European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of African Unity, African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 13, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (19820; see also INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY DOCUMENTS (Frithjof
Ehm & Christian Walter eds., 2015).
191 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10,
1948).
192 Christina Binder, Two Decades of International Electoral Support: Challenges and
Added Value, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 213, 214 (2009) (“Between 1987 and 2002,
observers were present for 86 per cent of the national elections in 95 newly democratic
or semi-authoritarian regimes.”).
193 Matanock gives two reasons for the continued spread:
[T]he spread of international election observation became almost unstoppable: once international election observation was employed by states in
a region, others in the same states began to employ it due to normative
pressure to conform or due to functionalist pressure to avoid being seen
as an obvious noncomplier, a concern that is well demonstrated across
cases in regions with high adoption rates (where some still violate standards of the international community).
AILA M. MATANOCK, ELECTING PEACE: FROM CIVIL CONFLICT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 86
(2017).
194 Thomas Legler & Thomas Kwasi Tieku, What Difference Can a Path Make? Regional
Democracy Promotion Regimes in the Americas and Africa, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 465, 469–
70 (2010).
195 Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups, and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the
Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 393, 396 (2010).
196 Madhav Joshi, United Nations Peacekeeping, Democratic Process, and the Durability
of Peace After Civil Wars, 14 INT’L STUD. PERSPS. 362, 367–368 (2013).
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elections.197 On two occasions, the Council approved the use of force to
dislodge leaders who defied an electoral loss.198
The idea of an international “democratic entitlement” is
controversial, not least because of a widely noted “democratic
recession” in recent years that threatens to reverse many democratic
transitions that gave rise to debate over the idea of electoral legitimacy
in the early 1990s.199 But the democracy protection regimes have
continued to function robustly throughout this period, and unlike
during the Cold War, no competing theory of governmental legitimacy
has entered the practice of international organizations.200
VII. THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF NIAC PEACE-MAKING
The second way NIAC agreements now engage with international
law is through a wholly multilateralized process of negotiation and
implementation. This process stands in stark contrast to traditional IAC
negotiations, which were either bilateral or involved third party
mediators (usually states) with strategic interests in the final outcome.
The contemporary NIAC processes are regularly facilitated by the U.N.
or a regional organization. These international organizations are, in
turn, part of a much larger cohort of international actors involved in
every aspect of NIACs. As James Fearon observes, high-profile
peacekeeping operations, the most visible manifestation of collective
involvement in NIACs, “are supported and supplemented by the work
and money of a host of intergovernmental, regional, and
nongovernmental organizations, aid agencies, donor conferences, and
election monitoring and human rights organizations—all with
programming and intervention theories developed for civil war-torn
and ‘postconflict’ countries.”201 If the NIAC agreements’ focus on
197 Francesco Mancini, Promoting Democracy, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 235–58 (Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone & Bruno Stagno Ugarte eds.,
2016); Gregory H. Fox, Democratization, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR
TO THE 21ST CENTURY 69–84 (David Malone ed., 2004).
198 S.C. Res. 1162, ¶ 2 (Apr. 17, 1998) (commending ECOWAS after the fact for its role
in the Sierra Leonean transition); S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti).
199 See Amichai Magen, The Democratic Entitlement in an Era of Democratic Recession,
4 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 368, 370 (2015); Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the
Democratic Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 141, 153 (2015).
200 In 2019, for example, the African Union Peace and Security Council condemned
the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Sudan and the OAS General
Council refused to seat the ambassador appointment by Venezuelan President Nicholas
Maduro on the grounds that his election lacked legitimacy. See Gregory H. Fox & Brad
R. Roth, Introduction: Democracy and International Law: A (Re-) Introduction, in
DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xii, xliv (2020).
201 James D. Fearon, Civil War and the Current International System, 146 DÆDALUS J.
AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCIS., no. 4, Fall 2017, at 18, 25. This Article cannot detail all of ways
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governance is their most innovative substantive feature, the collective
negotiation and implementation of the agreements is their most
important procedural innovation.
How pervasive is the multilateral presence? The Uppsala Conflict
Data Program lists fifty-four final NIAC peace agreements between 1990
and 2017. Of these, as shown on Table 1, 69 percent (37/54) were
completed with either the U.N. or a regional organization as a party,
mediator, witness, or observer. If one takes account of the trend toward
greater IO involvement and counts only agreements from 2000 on, IO
involvement increases to 80 percent (43/54). And if one further adds
to this group the post-2000 agreements with no ex ante IO involvement,
but which the Security Council approved after their conclusion, the
figure increases to 89 percent. NIAC agreements concluded with no
multilateral involvement of any kind, either ex post or ex ante, are now
clearly outliers.

state and multilateral actors now respond to NIAC; there are simply too many actors
engaged in too many tasks.

Lusaka Protocol
Memorandum of Understanding (Luena Agreement)
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accords
Dayton Agreement
The Vance-Owen Plan
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi
Global Ceasefire Agreement
Declaration du sommet des chefs d'etats et de gouvernements de l'initiative regionale sur le processus de paix au Burundi
Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict
Acte d’Adhésion de la Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la
Paix (CPJP) à l’Accord de Paix Global de Libreville
Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction in the Central African Republic
Political Agreement for Peace in the Central African Republic

Angola

Angola

Bangladesh

Bosnia

Bosnia

Burundi

Burundi

Burundi

Chad

Central African Republic

Central African Republic

Central African Republic

2006

2017

2015

2012

1991

2008

2003

2000

1993

1995

1997

2002

1994

2016

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

International
Organization as
party, mediator,
witness or
observer
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Post-2000

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Security
Council
approves
agreement

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Security Council
authorizes
peacekeeping mission
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Peace Agreement between the Chadian Republic and the United
Front for Democratic Change (FUC)

Kabul Agreement

Afghanistan

Year
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Cambodia

Name of Agreement

Country

Table 1
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Yes
No

2002
2003
2009
1994

Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition
Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act
Peace Agreement Between the Government and Le Congres National Pour La Defense du Peuple (CNDP)
Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement
Accord cadre de Reforme et de Concorde Civile
Accord de Reforme et de Concorde Civile
Chapultepec Peace Agreement
Agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace

Djibouti

Djibouti

El Salvador

Guatemala

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes*

No

*The mission established for Colombia in 2016 was a political mission rather than a peacekeeping mission. Because its mandate was quite similar to that of other peacekeeping missions coded here—
to verify implementation of the peace agreement—this question is coded affirmatively. See S.C. Res. 2366, ¶ 2 (July 10, 2017).

1996

1992

2001

2000

1995

2003

No

Democratic Republic of
Congo
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Djibouti

Croatia

Comoros

2016

No

2022]

Colombia

1991

Acuerdo Final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Ejercito Popular de
Liberacion (EPL)
Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and
Lasting Peace
Accord sur les dispositions transitoires aux Comores (Accord de
Maroni)
Erdut Agreement

Colombia
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Pretoria Agreement on the peace Accords in Cote D' Ivoire (Pretoria
I)
Accord Politique de Ouagadougou/ Ouagadougou Political agreement
Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement
of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties
The Ohrid Agreement

Ivory Coast

Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal
and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

2006

1992

2015

1992

2013

2001

2003

2007

2005

2004

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No
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Nepal

Mozambique

Mali

Mali

Mali

Macedonia, FYR: Govt.

Liberia

Ivory Coast

Ivory Coast

2005

1993

1993

1998

846

Declaration of Adherence to the Preliminary Agreement for the
presidential election and inclusive peace negotiations in Mali
Pacte national conclu entre le gouvernement de la République du
Mali et les mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad consacrant le
statut particulier du nord au Mali
Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali - Issu du Processus
d'Alger
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique

Memorandum of understanding between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the free Aceh Movement
Accra III

Indonesia: Aceh

India

India

Agreement between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Selfproclaimed Military Junta (Abuja Peace Agreement)
Memorandum of settlement and Bodoland Autonomous council act,
1993
Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993

Guinea Bissau
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Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and the RUF/SL (Abidjan Peace Agreement)
Interim Constitution

Rwanda

Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan
and the SPLM/SPLA
Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)
The Moscow Declaration
Good Friday Agreement

South Sudan: Govt.

Tajikistan

United Kingdom/Ireland

Sudan

Sudan

South Sudan: Govt.

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan
(GRSS) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
(SSDM/A)
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Jonglei state

South Sudan: Govt.

South Africa: Govt.

Sierra Leone

Philippines: Mindanao

Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

Agreement establishing permanent peace between the government of
Niger and ORA
Bougainville Peace Agreement

1998

1997

2005

2005

2015

2014

2012

1993

1996

1993

2014

1996

2001

1995

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No
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Philippines: Mindanao

Papua New Guinea

Niger
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The argument here is not that international actors have excised the
conflict parties from NIAC peace processes and disregarded their
preferences. The international community has not imposed a postconflict governance regime on a state (or portion thereof) since the East
Timor mission in 1999, and there seems to be little appetite to resume
this practice.202 The U.N. Secretary-General has instructed his mediators
that effective mediation “responds to the specificity of the conflict” and
“takes into account the causes and dynamics of the conflict, the
positions, interests and coherence of the parties, the needs of the
broader society, as well as the regional and international
environment.”203
The argument is rather that the goal of reaching a peace agreement,
which presumably all parties share if the agreements further their
interests, is now substantially enhanced by an infrastructure of
international actors whose presence can reorient the parties’ incentives
in favor of an agreed outcome. The following Sections show how IOs
have institutionalized the commitment to negotiated ends to NIACs and
how party incentives to reach agreement are altered and enhanced by
the multilateral presence. The upshot is that the old notion of NIAC
agreements as effectively private contracts between national actors,
operating in a cocoon of protected domestic autonomy, is hopelessly out
of date.
A. Institutions to the Fore
International efforts to reach peace agreements begin long before
negotiations themselves. And many pre-negotiation initiatives, as well
as positions IO take during negotiations, involve commitments to help
implement agreements after they are concluded. Understanding the
institutionalized commitment to peace agreements requires examining
this entire timeline.

202 S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (creating the U.N. Transitional Authority in East
Timor). In addition to East Timor, the other regimes in the 1990s were in Bosnia,
Kosovo, and the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia. For a full description of each, see
FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION, supra note 177, at 72–111.
203 U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc A/66/811,
annex I (June 25, 2012).
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1. Setting Expectations for an Agreement
Efforts by international organizations to end NIACs peacefully
begin when a conflict begins.204 The Security Council and regional
organizations consistently demand that fighting end. One study found
that the Council did so in 82 percent of NIACs since 1990 in which it
invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, and 100 percent of such conflicts
that began after 1990.205 A useful example is the multiparty conflict in
the DR Congo, in which the Council over a period of almost two decades
has demanded that all parties and “all armed groups” “immediately
cease all forms of violence,”206 “immediately cease the hostilities[,]”207
“lay down their arms and engage voluntarily and without any further
delay or preconditions in their demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement, and reintegration, as appropriate, . . . “208 “cease
immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities and
that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down
their arms and demobilize children from their ranks[,]” among many
other similar exhortations.209
These seemingly anodyne statements are significant for two
reasons. First, none of the regional organizations’ constitutive
instruments prohibits the internal use of force in the manner of Article
2(4) prohibiting interstate force.210 Demanding the peaceful resolution
of domestic conflicts suggests the organizations have identified policy
imperatives critical enough that they should be pursued despite the lack
of a legal foundation in the constitutive treaty.211 Second, demanding
the cessation of hostilities establishes that termination short of
204 On occasion, the U.N. takes initiatives even earlier with efforts at conflict
prevention. See U.N. DEP’T OF POL. AFFS., UNITED NATIONS CONFLICT PREVENTION AND
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN ACTION 3 (2018). See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective
Recommitment, U.N. Doc. S/2015/730 (Sept. 25, 2015).
205 Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14, at 683–84.
206 S.C. Res. 2556, ¶ 13 (Dec. 18, 2020); S.C. Res. 2053, ¶ 18 (June 7, 2012).
207 S.C. Res. 1468, ¶ 8 (Mar. 20, 2003).
208 S.C. Res. 1794, ¶ 3 (Dec. 21, 2007).
209 S.C. Res. 2136, ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 2014).
210 The constitutive treaties of major regional organizations—the European Union,
African Union, the Organization of African States, NATO, and the Economic Community
of West African States—provide that nothing in those instruments affects obligations
under the U.N. Charter. They do not go further than the Charter and prescribe limits on
the internal use of force.
211 Among the many legal issues raised by such demands is whether even the Security
Council has authority to bind non-state rebel groups. See generally Leonardo Borlini &
Robert Kolb, Le Conseil de Securite des Nations Unies et les Entites Non Etatiques, 125
REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 25 (2021). Council demands that would bind only the
governmental party to a NIAC would be of little practical use.
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complete victory by one side is the only acceptable outcome for the
organization. The imperative to reach a negotiated settlement is set at
the outset of the organization’s engagement.
If these calls are not heeded—and they frequently are not—the
Security Council may respond to the particular tactics employed by
governments or rebels. The Council has called for an end to human
rights violations and corruption; respect for the rule of law; elections;
reconciliation mechanisms to address human rights violations of prior
regimes; and the prosecution of those who committed international
crimes during the conflict.212 Like the Council’s calls for ceasefires, these
calls to cease particular actions are important for setting expectations.
The resolutions signal that any later peace agreement must address
actions the Council found unacceptable as they were happening.
2. Mediation Mechanisms and Standards
The next step is to convene negotiations. In the past two decades,
the U.N. and regional organizations converted what were once ad hoc
mediation efforts into permanent institutions. In 2006, the U.N. created
a Mediation Support Unit (“MSU”) to address a wide range of peace
issues: “peace negotiations, process design, constitution-making,
power-sharing, gender issues, security arrangements, transitional
justice and natural resources.”213 The MSU maintains a roster of experts
on standby to engage in these activities. Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General regularly convene and mediate peace conferences
and sign peace agreements as witnesses or, occasionally, as parties.214
The European Union created a Mediation Support Team within its
European External Action Service in 2011. The Team provides advice
and training to a pool of EU mediators both before missions depart and
while they are in the field. In addition, the EU has played a significant
role in a number of collective coordination mechanisms to support
peace processes, such as U.N. Contact Groups and Groups of Friends.215

See generally Fox, Boon & Jenkins, supra note 14.
U.N. Dep’t of Pol. & Peacemaking Affs., Mediation Support Unit Factsheet, U.N.
PEACEMAKER 2, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UNDPPA_
MSU_Factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
214 See Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, The International Regime for
Treating Civil War, 1988–2017, 147 DEADALUS 171, 172–73 (2018); Kyle Beardsley, The
U.N. at the Peacemaking–Peacebuilding Nexus, 30 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 369, 375
(2013); U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/72/115, ¶ 14–16 (June 27, 2017).
215 Julian Bergmann & Arne Niemann, Mediating International Conflicts: The
European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?, 53 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 957, 957 (2015).
212
213
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In 2010, the Organization of American States created a Section for
Institutional Strengthening in Dialogue and Mediation, “which supports
the efforts of the General Secretariat of the OAS and OAS member states
to develop their capacity to promote dialogue, consensus-building, and
the peaceful resolution of social conflicts.”216 In 2014, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) created a Mediation
Support Team, which has been described as a “copy-paste” from the U.N.
MSU.217 Importantly, the Team is integrated into the OSCE’s executive
functions.218 Two bodies of the African Union (“AU”)—the Peace and
Security Council and the Panel of the Wise—have mandates to mediate
conflicts on the continent.219 The AU has engaged in several mediations,
though a lack of resources and experienced mediators has hampered its
effectiveness.220 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(“IGAD”), a sub-regional organization in the Horn of Africa and Great
Lakes regions, established a Mediation Support Unit in 2012.221 In
addition, the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”)
created a Mediation Facilitation Division in 2015 to provide operational
support, backup resources, and capacity building in mediation.222
The Secretary-General has provided guidance to United Nations
mediators on “a number of key fundamentals that should be considered
in a mediation effort.”223 These recommendations are largely grounded
in international law: “[m]ediators also conduct their work within the
216 YADIRA SOTO, INT’L IDEA, THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN
CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES IN THE AMERICAS 12 (2016), https://www.idea.int/sites/default
/files/publications/the-role-of-the-organization-of-american-states-in-conflict-affected-states-in-the-americas.pdf.
217 Christina Stenner, The Institutionalization of Mediation Support: Are Mediation
Support Entities There Yet?, BERGHOF FOUND. 4 (2017), https://berghof-foundation.org/
library/the-institutionalization-of-mediation-support-are-mediation-support-entitiesthere-yet; see also DAVID LANZ, JAMIE PRING, CORINNE VON BURG & MATHIAS ZELLER, SWISSPEACE,
UNDERSTANDING MEDIATION SUPPORT STRUCTURES 9–12 (2017), https://edoc.unibas.ch/
56416/1/20171020132242_59e9dc82ab139.pdf.
218 David Lanz, Charting the Ups and Downs of OSCE Mediation, 27 SEC. & HUM. RTS.
243, 250 (2016) (“The team is located in the Conflict Prevention Centre, the key
department within the OSCE Secretariat in terms of political analysis and operational
support.”).
219 Chika Njideka Oguonu & Christian Chukwuebuka Ezeibe, African Union and
Conflict Resolution in Africa, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCIS. 325, 327 (2014).
220 Id. at 331.
221 Lanz et al., supra note 218, at 16.
222 ECOWAS Comm’n, ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines, CRISIS MGMT. INITIATIVE 41 (Feb.
2018), http://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ECOWAS-Mediation-Guidelines_
ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines].
223 United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, U.N. PEACEMAKER 3 (2012),
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf.
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framework constituted by the rules of international law that govern the
given situation, most prominently global and regional conventions,
international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee laws, and
international criminal law, including, where applicable, the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.”224 One particular point of
emphasis is the Secretary-General’s refusal to allow his representatives
to approve peace agreements that provide amnesties for international
crimes.225 Similarly, ECOWAS instructed its mediators to “uphold
ECOWAS norms,” which include “human and people’s rights, political
pluralism and democracy, non-aggression, peaceful settlement of
disputes, solidarity, equality and inter-dependence, accountability,
economic and social justice and popular participation in
development.”226 ECOWAS mediators “shall not be neutral to any of the
parties in situations where the fundamental norms and principles of
ECOWAS are violated.”227 The European Union describes the “defining
feature” of its mediation initiatives as its operation as a “values based
actor.”228 Its approach to mediation involves principles of human rights
and inclusive governance.229 The same is true for instructions in the
OSCE230 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the AU.231
224 Id. at 16; see also Guidelines for United Nations Representatives on Certain Aspects
of Negotiations for Conflict Resolution, 2006 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 496 (2009).
225 U.N. Secretary-General, Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional and
Subregional Organizations on Mediation, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/70/328 (Aug. 19, 2015)
(United Nations “can never endorse a peace agreement that provides for amnesties for
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights,
including conflict-related sexual violence.”).
226 ECOWAS Mediation Guidelines, supra note 222, at 53.
227 Id.
228 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Concept on EU Peace
Mediation, 13951/20, at 4 (2020), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.
en20.pdf.
229 Id. (“The EU should consistently engage on the basis of its foundational values
which include respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities as well
as pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality.”).
230 ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE FACILITATION IN THE
OSCE: REFERENCE GUIDE 74 (2014), https://www.osce.org/secretariat/126646 (A peace
agreement “should recognize and express respect to all relevant international
humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws, as well as recognized democratic
standards and the rule of law.”).
231 The African Union has described “sustainable and robust agreements” as
“respecting global standards of justice and human rights consistent with international
standards for individuals and groups.” AFRICAN CTR. FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOL. OF
DISPUTES, AFRICAN UNION MEDIATION SUPPORT HANDBOOK 149 (2014), https://
www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-mediation-support-handbook-2014-1-.pdf. But it also
emphasizes that mediators “need[] to work with the various parties in an even-handed
manner, without condemning them.” Id. at 83. While the “non-condemning approach
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Derrick Frazier and William Dixon have found that when
international organizations serve as conflict mediators, they are
substantially more likely to achieve settlements than mediation by
individual states or coalitions of states.232 They attribute this success to
perceptions of IOs as honest brokers. “Multilateral actors provide
legitimacy and are more likely to foster trust that the organization will
help fulfill the terms of the settlement. State interventions, on the other
hand, are easier to perceive as being driven not by altruistic goals but
more by foreign policy priorities.”233
3. Supporting and Implementing Final Agreements
If a peace agreement is eventually signed, the Security Council
regularly voices its approval and creates mechanisms for its
implementation.234 In some cases, that approval is preordained, as
when the agreement itself calls for U.N. or regional involvement. In the
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, for example, the
parties agreed “to request the United Nations to constitute a lean,
effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to
monitor and verify this Agreement.”235 In the 2003 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement for Liberia, the parties requested the U.N. “to facilitate,
constitute, and deploy a United Nations Chapter VII force in the Republic
of Liberia to support the transitional government and to assist in the
implementation of this Agreement.”236 In the 2000 Agreement of Cease
Fire and Cessation of Hostilities for Sierra Leone, the parties agreed “the
United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone shall supervise and monitor the
cease-fire.”237 In other cases, where a peacekeeping mission is already
does not mean that perpetrators of human rights violations or even war crimes should
not be addressed, tried and judged,” the AU states that “it is not the mediator’s role to
implement ethical considerations.” Id.
232 Derrick V. Frazier & William J. Dixon, Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated
Settlements, 1946–2000, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 384, 401 (2006).
233 Id.
234 See S.C. Res. 2261 (Jan. 25, 2016) (Colombia peace agreement); S.C. Res. 2241 (Oct.
9, 2015) (South Sudan peace agreement); S.C. Res. 1858 (Dec. 22, 2008) (Burundi peace
agreement); S.C. Res. 1371 (Sept. 21, 2001) (Macedonia peace agreement); S.C. Res.
1260 (Aug. 20, 1999) (Sierra Leone peace agreement); S.C. Res. 1216 (Dec. 21, 1998)
(Guinea-Bissau peace agreement); S.C. Res. 782 (Oct. 13, 1992) (Mozambique peace
agreement). For a discussion of these and other representative cases, see Edwards &
Worboys, supra note 140, at 114–17.
235 Sudan Agreement, supra note 147, ¶ 15.1.
236 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the Political
Parties, U.N. Doc. S/2003/850 (Annex), art. 4(1) (2003).
237 Agreement of Cease-Fire and Cessation of Hostilities, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1091
(Annex), art. 3(1) (2000).
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in the country, the mission’s mandate has been expanded to include
implementation tasks.238
Christine Bell has detailed how interpretation and implementation
of peace agreement obligations have often been ceded to international
actors.239
Mechanisms include binding arbitration, conciliation,
granting interpretive authority to international courts, and delegating
specific tasks to international agencies, such as granting the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees a role in refugee return.240 The most
complete example is the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina,
to whom the Dayton Peace Accords granted authority to impose laws
deemed necessary to carry out the Accords’ objectives and to remove
from office elected leaders who obstruct the Accords’
implementation.241 International criminal law is also a common feature
of implementation. The Security Council regularly calls for conflict
parties violating international humanitarian and criminal law to be
punished, referring two situations involving NIACs in Libya and Sudan
to the International Criminal Court.242
The implementation tasks given to peacekeepers themselves are
varied, as would be expected when mandates derive from individually
negotiated agreements. In addition to providing security, peacekeepers
assist in implementing the entire range of governance norms typical of
NIAC agreements.243 To pick subsets of many possible examples, human
rights appeared in peace agreements and Security Council peacekeeping

In the case of Mali, the MINUSMA mission, which the Council created in 2013, had
its mandate enlarged in 2015 to include support for implementing the Agreement on
Peace and Reconciliation. See S.C. Res. 2227 (June 29, 2015). In the case of Sierra Leone,
the parties to the Lomé Peace Agreement requested the Security Council amend the
mandate of the existing UNOMSIL mission, created in 1999, to “enable it to undertake
the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement.” Peace Agreement Between
the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art.
XIV (1999).
239 BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE, supra note 8, at 181–87.
240 Id. at 182–83.
241 PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998; Self-Sustaining Structures,
OFF. OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE § XI (1998), http://www.ohr.int/pic-bonn-conclusions/
?print=pdf.
242 See Marco Roscini, The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of
International Humanitarian Law, 43 ISR. L. REV. 330, 344 (2010); David Scheffer, The
United Nations Security Council and International Criminal Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 178 (William Schabas ed., 2016); S.C. Res. 1593
(Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC); S.C. Res.
1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (referring the situation in Libya to the ICC).
243 The Council often instructs peacekeepers to assist in implementing an entire
peace agreement, meaning the specifics of the peacekeepers’ mandate is to be found in
the agreement itself and not the authorizing resolution.
238
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mandates for Angola, the Central African Republic, and Mali.244
Elections were addressed in Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Côte
d’Ivoire.245 Corruption was addressed in Rwanda and Sierra Leone.246
Women’s rights were addressed in Mali, Sudan, and Tajikistan.247 And
judicial independence was addressed in Angola, the Central African
Republic, and Sudan.248
4. Sanctioning Intransigent Parties
If these varied international efforts to finalize and implement
agreements are the carrots to facilitate a lasting peace, sanctions are the
sticks. From 1991 to 2014, the Security Council imposed sanctions
against NIAC parties in Angola (started 1993), the Central African

244 See Lusaka Protocol, supra note 155, at 26; S.C. Res. 952, ¶ 4 (Oct. 27, 1994)
(Angola); Acte d’Adhésion de la Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP)
à l’Accord de Paix Global de Libreville (Aug. 25, 2012), https://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CF_120825_ActeAdhesionCPJP.pdf; S.C. Res. 2088, supra
note 17, ¶ 10 (Central African Republic); Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali:
Issu du Processus d’Alger (2015), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org
/files/Accord%20pour%20la%20Paix%20et%20la%20R%C3%A9conciliation%20au
%20Mali%20-%20Issu%20du%20Processus%20d%27Alger_0.pdf; S.C. Res. 2227,
supra note 238 (Mali).
245 Agreement Between Goira & Hezb-E-Islami Of Afghanistan Led By Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar (2016), https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1739;
S.C. Res. 2344, ¶ 5(b) (Mar. 17, 2017) (Afghanistan); U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated
Feb. 7, 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/51/796 and U.N Doc.
S/1997/114 (Annex II), at 39; S.C. Res. 1094 (Jan. 20, 1997) (Guatemala); Accord
Politique de Ouagadougou (2007), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/CI_070304_Accord%20Politique%20de%20Ouagadougou%20%28Frenc
h%29.pdf; S.C. Res. 1765, ¶ 1 (July 16, 2007) (Côte d’Ivoire).
246 Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (1993), supra note 158, at 4 (incorporating prior agreement
with anti-corruption provisions); S.C. Res. 872 (Oct. 5, 1993); Agreement of Ceasefire
and Cessation of Hostilities between the Sierra Leone Government and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), U.N. Doc, S/2000/1091 (Nov. 14, 2000),
https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/320; S.C. Res. 1370 (Sept.
18, 2001).
247 Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali, supra note 244; S.C. Res. 2227,
supra note 244, ¶¶ 12–14 (Mali); Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (2005), supra note 155, sec. 1.6.2.16; S.C. Res. 1590 (Mar. 24, 2005)
(Sudan); General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in
Tajikistan (1997), U.N. Doc. A/52/219 & S/1997/510 (Annex I); S.C. Res. 1167 (May 14,
1998) (Tajikistan).
248 Lusaka Protocol, supra note 155; S.C. Res. 952, supra note 244: Acte d’Adhésion
de la Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) à l’Accord de Paix Global
de Libreville, supra note 244; S.C. Res. 2088, supra note 18; Comprehensive Peace
Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA, supra note 155; S.C.
Res. 1590, supra note 247.
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Republic (started 2013), Côte d’Ivoire (started 2004), DR Congo (started
2003), various parts of the former Yugoslavia (started 1991), Kosovo
(started 1998), Liberia (started 1992), Libya (started 2011), Rwanda
(started 1994), Sierra Leone (started 1997), Somalia (started 1992), and
Sudan (started 1996).249 One study reports that from 1990 to 2018 the
Council imposed sanctions on twenty-eight rebel groups in thirteen civil
wars.250 The European Union has in some cases imposed sanctions in
conjunction with U.N. measures.251 Sanctions are deployed not only
when parties violate peace agreements, but across the entire lifetime of
peace-making efforts, from ceasing hostilities to negotiating an
agreement to supporting agreements to supporting peacekeeping
missions.252 At each stage, sanctions are deployed to support an existing
diplomatic channel: another study found that the U.N. combines
targeted sanctions with significant diplomatic initiatives 97 percent of
the time.253
The frequency of sanctions and their use in conjunction with
diplomatic initiatives may suggest a more coordinated approach than
actually occurs. U.N. sanctions often co-exist with sanctions that
regional organizations and individual states have imposed. Even within
the U.N., the same organs do not control both initiatives, with the
Security Council imposing sanctions and the Secretary-General
coordinating negotiations. With so many independent decision-makers,
optimal use of sanctions to compel support for peace processes is
difficult to achieve. Yet sanctions have been shown to change some
rebel behavior and to lead to more favorable conditions for conflict
resolution.254

Thomas Biersteker & Zuzana Hudáková, UN Sanctions and Peace Negotiations:
Possibilities for Complementarity, OSLO F. PAPERS, 15–20 (Jan. 2015), http://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Oslo-Forum-Paper-UN-sanctions-and-peacenegotiations.pdf.
250 Mitchell Radtke & Hyeran Jo, Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and
Rebel Groups, 55 J. PEACE RSCH. 759, 759 (2018).
251 For a list of EU sanctions regimes, see EU Sanctions Map, https://sanctions
map.eu/#/main (last updated Nov. 14, 2021).
252 Biersteker & Hudáková, supra note 249, at 10–12.
253 Id. at 7; see also Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen, Targeting Sanctions and
Ending Armed Conflicts: First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda, 91 INT’L AFFS. 1387,
1395 (2015) (“[A] sizeable proportion of all UN sanctions have been used to support
peace processes.”).
254 Radtke & Jo, supra note 250, at 771. Beirsteker and Hudáková find a lower success
rate for all targeted groups or individuals, reporting that their “analysis of 63 episodes
of UN targeted sanctions over the past 24 years indicates that, on average, sanctions are
effective in coercing, constraining and/or signaling a target about 22% of the time.”
Beirsteker & Hudáková, supra note 249, at 8.
249
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For our purposes, the importance of sanctions resolutions lies less
in their ultimate effectiveness than their collective affirmation of the
peace agreement process. In resolutions imposing sanctions, the
Security Council recites a bill of particulars describing the provenance
of its call to end fighting, the importance of doing so, and the shared
investment of U.N. member states in a negotiated outcome.255 These are
indicia of the peace process’ legitimacy and the unacceptability of the
sanctioned party’s revanchist actions. The next step of imposing
sanctions that are costly to both the targets and the sanctioning states is
thereby logically compelled. When the parties demonstrate they are
willing to comply with obligations under a peace agreement, sanctions
are relaxed and eventually rescinded.256 The retribution that often
marked traditional IAC peace agreements is thus explicitly disclaimed.
5. An Example of Multilateralization: the Côte D’Ivoire Peace
Process
Côte D’Ivoire provides an example of how thoroughly NIAC peace
processes have been multilateralized. At every stage, international
actors worked in conjunction with the conflict parties or imposed their
views when the parties were uncooperative.
After a turbulent decade following the 1993 death of President
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the nation’s only leader since independence in
1960, a civil war erupted in 2002 between northern and southern
regions.257 There then followed eight different peace agreements, from
the Accra I Accord in September 2002 to the Fourth Supplementary
Agreement to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in December 2008.258
The agreements included commitments to reform laws on citizenship,
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (imposing sanctions on Sierra Leone).
In the case of Liberia, the Council imposed sanctions in 2003 for the parties’
failure to respect a ceasefire and implement critical aspects of the Accra peace
agreement. S.C. Res. 1521 (Dec. 22, 2003). In 2016, the Council determined that
the ceasefire in Liberia is being fully respected and maintained,
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and
restructuring of the security sector have been completed, the provisions
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are being fully implemented, and
significant progress has been made in establishing and maintaining
stability in Liberia and the subregion.
S.C. Res. 2288 (May 25, 2016). It thus terminated the sanctions. Id. ¶ 1.
257 See ALEXANDRA NOVOSSELOFF, INT’L PEACE INST., THE MANY LIVES OF A PEACEKEEPING
MISSION: THE UN OPERATION IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 3–6 (2018).
258 Peace Agreements Database, THE UNIV. OF EDINBURGH, https://www.peaceagreements.org/search?SearchForm%5Bregion%5D=1&SearchForm%5Bcountry_entity%
5D=37&SearchForm%5Bname%5D=&SearchForm%5Bcategory_mode%5D=any&
SearchForm%5Bagreement_text%5D=&s=Search+Database (last visited December 10,
2021).
255
256
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structure and hold free and fair elections, guarantee individual rights,
explore land tenure reform, and “restore the authority of the State and
to redeploy the administration and all public services throughout the
national territory.”259 While France took an early lead in convening and
mediating peace talks, and the last agreement was largely a national
initiative, the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General all played prominent roles as mediators.260 The
Security Council endorsed all of the major agreements.261 It also
established two peacekeeping missions, the second with a Chapter VII
mandate, to assist in implementing the accords.262 When rebel parties
reneged on the agreements in 2004, the Council imposed both an arms
embargo on the entire country and targeted sanctions on individuals
obstructing implementation.263 It also instructed the UNOCI mission to
“use all necessary means to carry out its mandate,” meaning it
authorized the use of force.264 The Council further condemned human
rights and humanitarian law violations and urged that the country hold
violators accountable.265
When President Laurent Gbagbo’s term ended on October 30,
2005, but new elections had not yet been scheduled, the Council
endorsed a twelve-month term extension for Gbagbo and the Prime
Minister.266 Both terms were to be “final.” It also established an
international working group and a mediation group, both led by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, tasked with creating a
road map for new elections.267 When elections still had not been held in
November 2006, the Council endorsed an additional “and final” twelvemonth extension of Gbagbo’s term.268 Elections finally took place in

259 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, ¶ 4.1, U.N. Doc. S/2007/144 (Mar. 13, 2007).
The other commitments listed were contained in the Lina-Marcoussis Agreement of
January 23, 2003, U.N. Doc. S/2003/99 (2003) (Annex I).
260 Novosseloff, supra note 257, at 4–15
261 See S.C. Res. 1479 (May 13, 2003) (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and Accra II
agreement); S.C. Res. 1572 (Nov. 15, 2004) (Accra III agreement); S.C. Res. 1600 (May 4,
2005) (Pretoria I agreement); U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/28 (July 6, 2005) (Pretoria II
agreement); U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/8 (Mar. 28, 2007) (Ouagadougou Political
Agreement).
262 S.C. Res. 1479, supra note 261 (MINUCI mission); S.C. Res. 1528 (Feb. 27, 2004)
(UNOCI mission).
263 S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 9 (Nov. 15, 2004).
264 S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 262, ¶ 8.
265 S.C. Res. 1946, ¶ 6(d) (Oct. 15, 2010); see also S.C. Res. 1633, ¶ 20 (Oct. 21, 2005);
S.C. Res. 1962), ¶ 9 (Dec. 20, 2010).
266 S.C. Res. 1721, ¶¶ 5, 6 (Nov. 1, 2006).
267 S.C. Res. 1633, ¶¶ 4, 13 (Oct. 21, 2005).
268 S.C. Res. 1721 ¶ 5 (Nov. 1, 2006).
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2010, with a second round concluding in late November.269 The
Independent Electoral Commission declared challenger Alassane
Ouattara the winner, a decision endorsed by the AU, ECOWAS, EU, the
International Organisation of La Francophonie, and the Carter Center.270
President Gbagbo refused to concede. Acting under Chapter VII,
the Security Council urged
all the Ivorian parties and stakeholders to respect the will of
the people and the outcome of the election in view of ECOWAS
and African Union’s recognition of Alassane Dramane
Ouattara as President-elect of Côte d’Ivoire and
representative of the freely expressed voice of the Ivorian
people as proclaimed by the Independent Electoral
Commission.271
In early December, ECOWAS suspended Côte d’Ivoire from the
organization for Gbagbo’s failure to relinquish power.272 Yet Gbagbo
remained in office, relying on a determination by the pliant
Constitutional Council that he in fact won the election.273 Conflict
between Gbagbo and Ouattara loyalists ensued. Fed up, the Security
Council authorized UNOCI on March 30, 2011, to “use all necessary
means” to protect civilians.274 On April 4, UNOCI and French forces
attacked Gbagbo’s camps and destroyed heavy weapons and munitions
stockpiles. Gbagbo capitulated one week later.275 The Security Council
welcomed Ouattara’s ascent to power.276 Gbagbo was eventually
detained and indicted by the International Criminal Court in November
2011 for his role in fomenting post-election violence.277

Novosseloff, supra note 257, at 15.
Novosseloff, supra note 257, at 15.
271 S.C. Res. 1962, ¶ 1 (Dec. 20, 2010).
272 African Union Suspends Ivory Coast Amid Political Chaos, CNN (Dec. 9, 2010, 2:31
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/12/09/ivory.coast.au/index.html.
273 Dire Tladi, Security Council, the Use of Force and Regime Change: Libya and Côte
d’Ivoire, 37 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 22, 31 (2012).
274 S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2011).
275 Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire,
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFFS. 825, 835 (2011).
276 S.C. Res. 1980 (Apr. 28, 2011) (Council welcomes news “that President Alassane
Dramane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire is now able to assume all his responsibilities as Head
of State, in accordance with the will of the Ivorian people expressed at the presidential
elections of 28 November 2010 and as recognized by the international community.”).
277 Novosseloff, supra note 257, at 19. Gbagbo was acquitted in November 2019 of
crimes against humanity. Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11
(Nov. 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi. As of March 31, 2021, the prosecutor’s appeal
failed, and the decision was deemed final. Id.
269
270
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UNOCI remained in Côte d’Ivoire until June 2017.278 Some of the
sanctions remained in place until April 2016.279 From the outset of the
conflict in 2002 until April 2016, the Council passed fifty-eight
resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire, many invoking Chapter VII.280
B. Recalibrating Incentives and Enhancing Transparency
Why should international organizations expect NIAC peace
processes to succeed? At first blush, there are many causes for
pessimism. Scholars building on Barbara Walter’s influential work have
described a series of reasons why, acting on their own, NIAC parties
have little reason to pursue negotiated settlements.281 The asymmetry
of resources between governments and rebels can lead governments to
believe they can win wars of attrition and rebels to fear they lack the
leverage to produce acceptable (or later, enforceable) agreements.282
All peace agreements require disarmament, and “as long as a threshold
exists beyond which unilateral defense is impossible, and both groups
realize that an opponent need only wait for this time to attack, they will
either avoid compliance altogether or simply renege on further
fulfillment at the first sign of default.”283 Even if parties initially agree to
a settlement, signs that one party has become weaker over time—
perhaps precisely because it has disarmed or taken other de-escalatory
actions—can provide incentives for the other party to renege on the
agreement.284 Because many NIACs occur in developing countries,
inadequate governmental capacity to implement an agreement can
create a disincentive for rebels to come to a final agreement. Faulty
perceptions can also work against settlement. Years of demonizing
opponents leave parties with little reason to trust that those same
S.C. Res. 2284, ¶ 14 (Apr. 28, 2016).
U.N. Secretary-General, Special Report of the Secretary-General: Role of the United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, ¶ 67, U.N. Doc. S/2018/958 (Oct. 29, 2018).
280 See UN Documents for Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council Resolutions, SEC. COUNCIL
REPORT, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-councilresolutions/page/1?ctype=C%26%23244%3Bte+d%26%238217%3BIvoire&cbtype=
cote-divoire#038;cbtype=cote-divoire (last visited December 10, 2021) (listing the
resolutions collected by Security Council Report).
281 Barbara F. Walter, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, 51 INT’L ORG. 335,
335–64 (1997).
282 Walter, supra note 145; JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA
15 (2009).
283 Walter, Critical Barrier, supra note 281, at 339–40; see also Aila M. Matanock, How
International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals, 23 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 357, 360 (2020)
(“Existing studies show that settlements typically reassert the state’s monopoly on
force, and so the rebels must demobilize and disarm as a bargain is implemented, even
if they will later be integrated into the state’s structures, including security forces.”).
284 Matanock, ELECTING PEACE, supra note 193, at 32–33.
278
279
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opponents will honor voluntary settlements. In sum, as Mattes and
Savun conclude, “[t]he basic problem that confronts the two parties is
that neither group can credibly promise to uphold the deal in the future
and both sides, knowing this, may prefer to continue to fight.”285
As Alina Matanock has observed, this credibility gap may be
understood as involving either inadequate information or incentives to
keep fighting. The information problem arises “because each side lacks
knowledge about whether its opponent will comply with complex deals
and yet must be confident that a minimum level of compliance is
maintained.”286 For example, rebels may interpret slight delays in
government implementation as foretelling a refusal to abide by the rest
of a peace agreement. The government may in fact be preparing to
renege on its obligations, but it may also have “delayed inadvertently
due to low capacity to implement, or it may have simply gone slower
than expected because it had a different understanding of the timeline
for compliance.”287 Absent full and accurate information, the rebels may
believe either scenario is plausible. The incentive problem is present
“because each side must anticipate that it and its opponent will benefit
from the settlement and face costs for non-compliance.”288 But both
benefits from compliance and costs for non-compliance will almost
certainly be illusory if the agreement is self-enforcing, especially if the
parties enter negotiations with an imbalance of resources. Absent a
reasonable assurance of positive benefits, neither side has an incentive
to give up the possibility of getting all it wants through total military
victory.
Both the informational and incentive problems are often more
acute for rebels than governments. Because governments “typically
know the state institutions better and have access to them during
implementation,” they are “typically better positioned to resist . . .
changes, including in ways that may not be recognized by other
actors.”289 For example, “governments may establish new ministries
that usurp some of the powers that had been promised to the rebels” or
they may “drag their feet on registering voters in rebel strongholds
when both factions are set to compete in postconflict elections.”290 Some
NIACs involve multiple rebel groups, resulting in multiple “veto players”
285 Michaela Mattes & Burcu Savun, Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment
Problems and Agreement Design, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 737, 740 (2009).
286 Matanock, ELECTING PEACE, supra note 193, at 34.
287 Id. at 35.
288 Id. at 34.
289 Matanock, supra note 283, at 359–60.
290 Id. at 360.
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who can stall peace negotiations.291 In such multi-rebel conflicts,
information asymmetries become particularly acute, since each party
must not only assess its probability of victory against every other party
individually but also the probability that it will prevail against all the
parties collectively. The opportunities for misperception, and thus fear
that an agreement will skew against a party’s interests, increase
substantially.
But these are all problems facing NIAC parties seeking peace on
their own. Third-party support can supply a “credible commitment” to
fill information gaps and recalibrate party incentives. Barbara Walter
describes credible commitments as a third party’s “guarantee that
groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be
kept” such that “payoffs from cheating on a civil war agreement no
longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing its terms.”292
International organizations make particularly credible commitments
because of their institutional commitment to neutrality. At the most
fundamental level, “the buffer of peacekeepers removes each faction’s
threat of subjugation by the other.”293 Involvement of international
organizations also enhances the status of the agreements themselves.
As Christine Bell observes, “[t]hird-party signatories help to insert some
of the advantages of treaty status into instruments whose status as
international agreements is questionable.”294
Matanock usefully breaks third-party commitments into separate
tasks. One is monitoring compliance with agreements and another
involves providing rewards for compliant behavior and punishments

291 David Cunningham borrows the concept of veto players in domestic policymaking to describe how multiple participants in civil war negotiations can stall or even
derail peace processes. D. E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 875, 877 (2006). He concludes that “civil wars with more veto players are
substantially more resistant to resolution. Id. at 891. Many conflicts examined here are
susceptible to multiple vetoes. In the DR Congo, for example, the 2002 Pretoria
Agreement was signed by the government and six opposition rebel parties. Global and
Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (‘The Pretoria
Agreement’), THE UNIV. OF EDINBURGH (2002), https://www.peaceagreements.org/
view/394/Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20in%
20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20.
292 Walter, supra note 281, at 340. This view now dominates the international
relations literature; see Madhav Joshi & J. Michael Quinn, Is the Sum Greater than the
Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited,
31 NEGOT. J. 7, 8 (2015) (“Credible commitment theory has, arguably, become the
dominant theoretical approach to negotiations in civil wars in the field of political
science.”).
293 Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman & Megan Shannon, United Nations Peacekeeping and
Civilian Protection in Civil War, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875, 888 (2013).
294 Bell, supra note 8, at 401.
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for non-compliance.295
First, monitoring can help overcome
information gaps by supplying both sides with neutral and timely
updates on the other side’s behavior.296 Whether both sides are
disarming or using the immediate post-agreement period to strengthen
their military positions is particularly important to monitor and
report.297 Peacekeepers and other third parties often monitor elections,
seen as a critical test of whether former combatants can fairly compete
for political power. Knowing that the U.N. and regional organizations
report the results of monitored elections can incentivize parties to run
candidates and otherwise participate since they know cheating will be
called out and the winner supported. A flow of accurate information
also helps change party incentives. Incorrectly believing opponents are
violating a peace agreement naturally leads parties to violate their
obligations in the interest of self-preservation. Full and accurate
information can turn such zero-sum perceptions into a belief that
positive-sum outcomes are possible.
Second, international actors reward compliance with peace
agreements and punish violations in a variety of ways. Rewards can be
as general as the legitimacy new regimes enjoy when their control over
the apparatus of state power is deemed to comply with international
standards. International recognition of a government, especially where
another faction disputes the result of an election, means it can fully
participate in interstate relations and request benefits from
international lenders and others.298 More tangible rewards have more
often come via bilateral assistance. Foreign aid and preferential trade
terms, for example, can be extended or withdrawn depending on
compliance with peace agreements, international human rights, or
democracy standards.299
Punishments for violations can increase the cost of renewed
aggression, causing a party to rethink the benefit of reacting to another
party’s perceived defection from an agreement.300 The primary tool has
been sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. The Council has
targeted parties at all phases of the peace process, from the cessation of

Matanock, supra note 283, at 365–67.
Karl DeRouen Jr. & lshita Chowdhury, Mediation, Peacekeeping and Civil War
Peace Agreements, 29 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 130, 133 (2018).
297 Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen & Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Winning the Peace
Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict, 71 INT’L ORG. 163, 165 (2017).
298 See BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL
WAR 42 (2002).
299 Matanock, supra note 283, at 366–67.
300 Adedokun, supra note 174, at 30.
295
296
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hostilities to negotiations to implementation.301 The goals of the
sanctions are usually quite clear: as noted earlier, 97 percent of Council
sanctions are imposed in conjunction with ongoing negotiations,
meaning the sanctioned parties have been well apprised of why the
measures are imposed.302 Moreover, the Council’s switch in the 1990s
to “targeted sanctions”—imposed not on entire states or regions but
specific groups or individuals—allows it to specify precisely which
behavior it finds unacceptably destructive of a peace process.303
International criminal tribunals also punish peace process spoilers,
though their reach is limited, and the crimes within their jurisdiction do
not involve refusal to negotiate peace agreements or their violation as
such.304
Have IOs in fact provided credible commitments that make peace
agreements more likely? Walter’s data is striking: “between 1940 and
1990 enemies in civil wars almost always failed to reach successfully
negotiated solutions to their conflicts unless an outside power
guaranteed the safety of the belligerents during the ensuing transition
period.”305 A more recent study of peacekeeping missions from 1975 to
2004 finds that a promise of post-agreement monitoring via
peacekeeping makes it more likely parties will sign a NIAC peace
agreement.306 As Walter and her co-authors summarize the literature,
[w]hen a third party steps in, negotiated settlements almost
always bring at least five years of peace. When a third party
does not, combatants almost inevitably return to war.
Combatants appear to be looking down the road and factoring
in the presence of peacekeepers when deciding whether to
sign an agreement or continue to fight.307

Biersteker & Hudáková, supra note 249, at 8–12.
See supra text accompanying note 252.
303 See generally Thomas J Biersteker, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho & Zuzana
Hudáková, UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013), 55 J. PEACE RES. 404 (2018) (describing datasets disaggregating multiple aspects of targeted sanctions enabling conclusions about their targets, objectives, form, and effectiveness).
304 See generally, Gentian Zybert, The Role of International Criminal Courts and
Tribunals in Post-Conflict Societies, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BAS DE
GAAY FORTMAN 375 (Ineke Boerefijn, Laura Henderson, Ronald Janse & Robert Weaver
eds., 2012) (noting tribunals’ limited jurisdiction and describing “their main focus as
almost surgical: removing the main perpetrators of mass crimes from a post-conflict
society and subjecting them to a criminal legal process”).
305 Walter, supra note 281, at 360.
306 See Magnus Lundgren, Which Type of International Organizations Can Settle Civil
Wars?, 12 REV. INT’L ORG. 613, 615–19 (2017).
307 Barbara F. Walter, Lise Morje Howard & V. Page Fortna, The Extraordinary
Relationship Between Peacekeeping and Peace, 51 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1705, 1710 (2021).
301
302
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Of course, IOs and other third parties often fail to secure a peace
agreement or to prevent parties from violating agreements and
returning to combat. A vast literature exists analyzing such failures.308
But for our purposes, the relevant question is not whether most IO
interventions succeed in establishing and maintaining the peace; rather,
it is whether incentives change such that peace is achieved more often
in NIACs in which IOs intervene than in NIACs in which they do not. The
answer seems to be a clear yes.
C. The New Hegemony of Peace Agreements
Treatise writers in the nineteenth century commonly observed
that interstate conflicts could be terminated in three ways: the simple
cessation of hostilities, a treaty of peace, or conquest.309 While treaties
were the most common, the choice was up to the parties and
international law acquiesced. In the case of conquest, effectively only
the stronger party made the choice. As Oppenheim wrote of a state
poised to subjugate its opponent, “if he desires to acquire the whole of
the conquered territory for himself, he annexes it, and thereby formally
ends the war through subjugation.”310 That was that.
A NIAC party seeking to rout its opponent can still do so, but to
describe that outcome as an equivalent “choice” would be to create a
highly misleading false equivalence. International law no longer
acquiesces in strategies of total victory, despite NIAC parties not being
formally constrained by jus ad bellum-type rules. To achieve full
military victory, a NIAC party must now push past a thicket of
multilateral carrots and sticks that have led most post-Cold War NIACs
to end in a negotiated agreement. Reaching agreements has become as
much of a common goal for international institutions as the substantive
norms of governance discussed in the last section. The reconfigured
incentives produced by the multilateral presence—which begin when
conflicts begin and continue long after agreements are signed—have
made parties’ acceptance of an agreement substantially more likely.

308 See Michael J. Gilligan & Ernest J. Sergenti, Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using
Matching to Improve Causal Inference, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 89, 92–93 (2008) (collecting
citations).
309 See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 275.
310 Id. at 278–79.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW PEACE AGREEMENTS
“Peace agreements” were once a discrete category in international
law. As interstate treaties in an era of maximum sovereign autonomy,
they lawfully allowed states to arrange their relations at the end of IACs
in any manner that furthered their national interests. Victorious states
were exempt from a defense of coercion and could impose on defeated
states any terms they found useful or just politically satisfying. More
significantly, IAC agreements also signaled the transition from wartime
to peacetime and the vast normative category shift that followed.
Innumerable areas of interstate relations were affected.
But international law has all but abandoned the doctrines and
categories that created such a critical role for IAC treaties. Warring
parties who initiate a conflict in violation of the U.N. Charter cannot
impose a peace treaty on the losing state. And the former distinction
between wartime and peacetime that underpinned the IAC agreements’
signaling function has been almost wholly abandoned. Many legal
regimes apply both in times of peace and conflict, and others terminate
when certain factual thresholds are crossed, not upon the conclusion of
a peace treaty.
International institutions have also moved on because they must:
NIACs vastly outnumber IACs as the dominant form of contemporary
conflict. Not surprisingly, NIACs have also generated the vast majority
of peace agreements. The demise of IAC agreements, combined with
international law’s traditional view of civil wars (absent external
intervention) as essentially domestic matters, and the uncertain status
of NIAC agreements as binding instruments, might suggest international
law has only marginal relevance to those agreements. National military
manuals barely mention NIAC agreements and none of the agreements
is registered as a “treaty” with the U.N. Secretary-General.
But this Article has shown that, in two respects, international law
plays a critical role in the genesis of NIAC agreements. First, the
agreements paralleled international law’s recent concern with
governance by restructuring domestic institutions to replace military
conflict with political competition. Their governance focus is the logical
consequence of international law’s refusal to “resolve” NIACs through
large-scale and violent changes to national borders and demographic
profiles. The agreements thus assume an inward, constitution-like
focus, following on international norms of human rights, democratic
elections, and the rule of law among others. The U.N. in particular stakes
much of the legitimacy of these reforms on their grounding in
international law.
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Second, NIAC agreements have abandoned the private contract
model of their IAC predecessors and become deeply embedded in
multilateral peace making. International actors wield incentives and
sanctions from the onset of conflict through the agreements’
implementation. In so doing, international actors radically expand the
factors militating toward a peace settlement: new ideas for co-existence
in a post-conflict society; the monitoring of critical agreement
milestones, such as troop demobilization and elections; dispatching
peacekeeping missions; mobilizing multilateral aid agencies; and
sanctioning violators. These added factors, especially those providing a
“credible commitment” of agreement enforcement, incentivize NIAC
parties to view a peace process as serving their interests.
Much remains for future scholarship. Does the broad body of NIAC
peace agreements in fact incorporate international governance norms?
If so, which norms and in which circumstances? What would cause NIAC
parties and the now omnipresent mediators to incorporate governance
norms? Are NIAC peace agreements negotiated “in the shadow” of
international law in the manner of domestic contracts? Is the presence
of an international organization before or during negotiations a causal
factor? Or are other attributes of a conflict responsible? Answers to
these empirical questions can help demonstrate how deeply the trends
discussed in this Article have permeated international practice.

